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problems of Conscience in Some of the Plays of Shakespeare
INTRODUCTION
A study of the Shakespeare ·criticism of the Eighteenth and the early part of the Nineteenth, Centuries,
compared with what may be called the modern method of interpretation, reveals striking contrasts.

During the

earlier period the 'interpretation or "appreciation" was
almost exclusively esthetic.

The plays were taken to

mean, not what Shakespeare intended them to mean, but
what the interpreters wished them to mean.

In the pre-

sent century, however, the labors of scholars have been
employed upon the exact and detailed analysis of the
plays, in an effort to discover what was their original
meaning,--the one Shakespeare put into them,--as interpreted not only be means of the text of the plays themselves, but by their connection with the history of the
Renaissance period, and of the age of Elizabeth in particular.
This change in the spirit of Shakespeare interpretation has been especially noticeable in the field of ethics
and moral philosophy.

There was room in this field for

endless vague and conjectural explanations, of the plays
in their entirety and of the characters considered individually.

It has been the effort of recent scholars,

in this field as in others, to discover as nearly as
possible Shakespeare's own attitude with regard to moral
problems, at least as he sets it forth in the plays.
Much valuable research has been done along these lines;
however, the specific problem of conscience as a guiding
factor in man's actions, seemed still to offer many possibilities for fruitful research.

It is upon this problem

then, that the present study is based.
The first part of the study consists of a general
statement of the Elizabethan conception of conscience,
and an endeavor to show how this conception derives from
the scholastic teaching.

I have traced the general princi-

ples upon which this conception is built up, from the
ancient philosophers up through the medieval, reaching
their clearest definition in the work of St. Thomas
Aquinas.

Then I have endeavored to point out the modi-

fications that the Renaissance brought about in the idea,
and finally the particular application of the principles
in Elizabethan psychology and philosophy.
In the second division of the thesis the place of
conscience in Elizabethan moral philosophy is discussed.
The relative importance of foreign influences upon the
philosophy of the times is a point that has received comment.

Then I have endeavored to point out the relation-

ship of reason to conduct, a subject which assists greatly

~------------------------~
in the correct placing of the conscience motive.

Revenge

also bears an important part in the motivating of actions
at this period, and the study of the Elizabethan idea of
revenge has a close connection with the conscience idea.
As a final introductory step before taking up the principal part of the thesis, it was necessary to explain the
distinction between the tragic hero and the villain.

The

distinction is brought about to a great extent by the
difference in motive, and is of great importance for the
correct interpretation of the dramatic works of the period,
especially the works of Shakespeare.
The discussion of Elizabethan psychology in its bearing upon the morality of actions leads finally to the
center of the research,--an analysis of some of the great
plays in an effort to interpret the motives for action,
also the effects of actions,--that is, the conscience
condemning or praiSing for deeds already done.

I have

selected as the basis of the study the four great ideal
tragedies,--Macbeth, Othello, King Lear, and above all,
Hamlet.

I have made reference also to a number of other

tragedies, among them Coriolanus and Richard III, and
also, to a limited degree, some of the comedies which
present distinct conscience problems.
The final chapter of the thesis is a summary of the
findings in this field, and an attempt to show the great

r

-~-------------------------------------------------------------,

importance of the conscience theme in influencing the
action of the plays and the development of the characters.
These problems were studied from the Renaissance and
Elizabethan viewpoint, and I have endeavored to show that
Shakespeare's attitude is authentic and according to
Christian standards.

PROBLEMS OF CONSCIENCE
IN SOME OF THE PLAYS OF SHAKESPEARE
Chapter I.

The Development of the Elizabethan Conception
of Conscience.

Of late years it has become increasingly evident to
students of Shakespeare, that, if one is to understand
and interpret the works of the great artist in any way
approaching authenticity, it is necessary to look at
them from the viewpoint of Shakespeare's own times.

This

modern study of Shakespeare takes into account the entire
scope of Elizabethan life and culture, and this is particularly true in the field of ethics and moral philosophy.
Shakespeare was undoubtedly a man of his time, a
complete product of the Renaissance.

In his plays one

finds that fullness of enthusiasm for discovery, that
unbounded patriotism, and that love of life for its own
sake, which characterized the period.

But if Shakespeare

was a man interested in the fullness of life as he found
it, he must have been more than anything else a thorough
student of human nature; and this study led him to a
profound consideration of moral problems.

In an age which

is credited with being almost entirely secular in its
viewpoint and its interests, this deep and sincere investigation of moral problems by the man who is the most
perfect exponent of his times, is highly significant.

Some writer. have said distinctly that Elizabethan life
left out of consideration the idea of religion, and they
credit, or discredit, Shakespeare with this lack of religion.
All things worked together to maKe the
a full and complete expression of the
Elizabethan Age. Whatever entered that Age,
and contributed to make it what it was, or
at least, what its report has been, entered
the Drama. To be sure, that had its natural
exclusions. It was not religious, and had
little to say of the soul's destinies beyond
the grave. ~.
~ama

Passages in the plays may doff the bonnet to the Christian faith; but only to meet
the dramatic turn. Shakespeare and his plays
are most genially of this world, its relationships, its passions, its sublimities and
depths, its vanities and hopes of fame--but
all on earth. The conventional references
to the superhuman or the supernatural are
often pagan by affinity, and seeming preference. 2.
One may find it necessary to agree with Taylor in
the statement, that, of formal religion there is little
expression in Shakespeare, but no one can deny that in
the plays there is a carefully worked out moral system,
in which good and evil are rightly related and evaluated,
and that he recognizes and insists upon the relation of
mants moral and spiritual life to God in its obligations
and allegiances.
1.

Henry Osborn Taylor, Thou~t and Expression in the
Sixteenth Century, Macmil an,~ Y., 1920, VOl.-rI,
p. 238.

2.

Ibid: p. 257.

To understand Shakespeare's delineation of ethical
and moral values, and the definite and consistent principles of morality upon which he builds up his great characters, it is necessary to understand the psychology and
moral philosophy, not of a later time, but of the time
in which he lived and wrote.
If we would understand and appreciate what Shakespeare meant to portray, we must know the principles
which he accepted as the basis and motive of moral life,
--not by any means as he applied it to his own conduct,
--which is at best a conjecture,--but as he made use of
it in the delineation of his characters.
A study of the plays in connection with the psychology of the period reveals that the poet had a definite and legitimate understanding of the problem of the
conscience, and that he has made extensive application
of the problem again and again in his plays, both in
tragedy and comedy.
To arrive at a correct and thorough understanding
of the psychology of which the conscience problem was
an important part, it is necessary to trace the Elizabethan concept of moral responsibility from its sources,
since the teachings of ancient and medieval philosophers
are undoubtedly the basis of Renaissance and Elizabethan
beliefs on the subject.

Elizabethan psychology derives primarily from
Aristotle, and since the development of the science can
be directly traced, and the ancient beliefs are borne
out in the later developments, it is necessary, for a
complete understanding of the system, to begin by a
comment upon the fundamental principle of Aristotelian
philosophy in this matter.

Before

Aristot~,

Heraclitus

taught that reason was a property of the universe, not
a property inherent in man, and that it was breathed
into man from the outside, somewhat as sensations were
received.

He did not make reason a party to moral re-

sponsibility as was done by later philosophers who better
understood its function.
Aristotle taught that in living things thBre are
three kinds of soul: the vegetal, which alone is possessed by plants, and which has to do with life, growth
and reproduction; the sensible soul, which, together
with the vegetal soul, is found in animals, and has to
do with sensation and motion and a seeking after good;
and, finally, the rational soul, which belongs only to
man, and is the seat of the reason and the will.

3.

Aristotle's sense psychology is much like the accepted psychology of the present time, and in its main
3.

Ruth Leila Anderson, Elizabethan Psychology and
Shakespeare's Plays, University Press, Iowa City,
Iowa, 1927, p. 14.

~~'---------------------------------------.
points agrees closely with that of the scholastics.

He

speaks of the central or common sense, by which he signifies the intellect and the imagination; and the outer
senses--the five senses which we recognize as such.

His

maxim, that nothing can be known to the inner sense except through the outer, is one of the doctrines of the
schoolmen.
A point in the psychology of the ancients, which
persisted up to the time of Shakespeare, and is of the
utmost importance in the correct interpretation of the
plays, is its physiological aspect.

Aristotle saw the

immediate connection between outer stimuli and sensation, although the science of physiology was too little
developed to provide an adequate explanation.

The

Greeks speak of a sort of fluid called "vital heat",
which assumes various forms as it assists the several
functions of the body.

Thus, it is a part of the blood,

it aids digestion, and becomes more and more refined as
it ascends to the head.

The physician Galen, in the

third century A. D., explained and systematized this
theory. 4.
The Greeks taught that children and animals live
according to their feelings--thus indicating that they
4.

-

George Sidney Brett, Psychology, Ancie~t and Modern,
Longmans Green & Co., N. Y., 1928, pp. 25-27.

appreciated the lack of moral responsibility in persons
who have not reached the age of discretion.

They taught

that vices are relapses into primitive states.

A brave

or a temperate man acts bravely in an emergency or overcomes temptations easily, because he has brought his
senses under the control of reason.

Complete virtue is

complete control of the impulses by the deliberative or
calculative reason.

This system of ethics is, of course,

false and incomplete in as much as it disregards the idea
of Good and the question of eternal justice, and defines
ethics as the sphere of praise and blame.

That is, a

good man does things that are praised, and a bad one
does things that are blamed,--not from any idea of responsibility to a Higher Being, but for the good of the
state.

This also was the doctrine of the Romans, in a

more restricted sense even than with the GreEk s.

The

Roman idea of right conduct or morals was conformity to
legal and social customs.
The Greek and Roman idea of conscience, the judgment in matters of conduct, was systematic and stable,
but it left out the theistic idea,--there was no consideration of moral obligation to a higher being.

Still,

the ancients have many expressions of praise for tfthe
peace of a good conscience. u5 •

The Greeks believed that

5. Reverend Joseph Rickaby, "Conscience", in Catholic
Encyclopedia, Vol. IV.

-----------------------------------.

~~
..

by constant practice of good deeds, and the experience
acquired by such practice, one's principles became fixed
and one became a more desirable and perfect member of
the State, just as in the Christian, perfect possession
of God by knowledge and love, will be the result of continuous attention to the warnings of conscience, and there
will be less and less likelihood of lapses from duty. 6.
The scholastic philosophy is based upon that of
Aristotle, one of the most essential differences being,
of course, the Christian viewpoint, responsibility to,
and dependence upon God.
In the works of the ecclesiastical writers, theology
held an important place, and reason lost its supreme position in favor of revelation.

The reason was a supernat-

ural power, not something flowing distinctly from nature,
but an attribute given to man by God, and by means of
which man became in a manner like God.

Man, by the gift

of his reason, became responsible to the Giver for his
voluntary actions.

His reason aided him in aspiring to

the supreme good, and it was against the reason, considered as one of God's greatest favors to man, to do
evil, and thus be drawn away from his final end.

Rever-

end Joseph Rickaby states:
6.

George Sidney Brett., Psychology;, Ancient and Modern,
Longmans Green, N. Y., 1928, p. 28.

F

------------------------------------------------.
The natural conscience is not a distinct
faculty, but the one intellect of man in as much
as it considers right and wrong in conduct,
aided meanwhile by a good will, and by the use
of the emotions, by the practical experience of
learning, and by the external helps that are to
the purpose. The natural conscience of the
Christian is known by him to act not alone, but
under the enlightenment and the impulse derived
from revelation and grace in a strictly supernatural order. 7.
In the theology of the Middle Ages the material and
physiological connection of the senses with reason continued to be accepted.

Knowledge must be acquired through

the senses, but there is a world of immaterial realities
which can be knovm or comprehended only by the intellect.
By means of reason one knows God, and by the will one
reaches out toward Him as the ultimate good.

The outer

senses, according to St. Thomas, were avenues by which
images were formed by means of the inner senses--common
sense, memory and imagination,--and then passed on to the
intellect.

He taught that reason was the link or inter-

preter between the knowledge received from the outer senses
and the intellect, which alone could comprehend God.

The

choice of good and the rejection of evil lay in the will,
directed and governed by the intellect.

In the ecclesi-

astical fathers, emphasis is placed upon the knowing of
God not by reason alone, but by faith.

Faith is the de-

sire to possess God as the highest good, and leads the
7.

Rickaby, op.cit.

~-----------------------------------------------------,
will to the performance of right actions.

It thus gives

a sanction to good deeds and is the motive-power of conscience.

It is with reason governing conduct and prac-

tise that this paper is concerned--the field of ethics
and the judgment of conscience.
Among medieval writers on the subject of reason, and
of morality through right reason, Reginald Pecock is a
sort of compendium of the scholastic theology accepted
generally by the people.
of all man's powers.

He makes reason the greatest

Even faith is subservient to it.

Whatever could not be proved by reason was not of faith.
Upon reason depended man's morality, because a deed could
not be morally virtuous 'unless it accorded with reason.
The will was a servant of the reason.
Free will is a power with which may
freely be loved and chosen that thing which
reason knoweth and deemeth to be good,--and
which may command to all other witty and moving
powers of the soul and to all members of the
body such moving proper workings as she wills
that they be commanded.
Man was made to rule his will and his
outward and inward wits and their appetites,
their doings and sufferings, after the doom
of reason, while he liveth in this life, that
he may obtain everlasting life before the presence of God. 8.
In his definition of sin he points out that it is only by
8.

Reginald Pecock, The Donet. Now first edited from
Ms. Bodl, 916, by~sie Vaughan Hitchcock, London,
Humphrey Milford, 1921, p. 12.

acting contrary to conscience that one can commit sin,
in other words, temptation is not sin.
Sin is not in the sinful desires engendered OY-the outward nor even by the inward
wits. It begins with the consenting of Reason
and Free Will to sinful desire. The wilful
choice of sin after Reason has pronounced upon
it is sin. 9.
In the Folewer to the Donet Pecock continues his explanation of the relation between reason and free will, and
gives to reason the credit for curbing the sensual appetites and preventing sin.

Thus according to his teach-

ing, free will, working in agreement with reason is what
defines a dictate of conscience.
Nearly all the medieval writers use Aristotle's
division of man's soul into the vegetal, the sensitive,
and the rational.

They agree, of course, as to the

outer wits, but there are many divergences with regard
to the relations and divisions of the inner wits.

The

outer wits--the five senses--are the means by which
knowledge of the outer world is presented to the inner
wits.

The inner wits, according to Batman--are feeling,
wit, imagination, reason and understanding. lO • Other
writers name common sense, imagination and memory, as
9. Ibid: p. 14.
10. ~man uppon Bartholeme, His Booke, ~ Propietatibus
Rerum, London, Thomas East, 1582, Liber Tertius,
Chapter 6, p. 13.

the internal senses, and say that these are the channels
by which impressions, received by the outer senses, are
transmitted to the intellect.

In some writers, then,

reason is considered to be a part of the sensitive soul,
and in others, as part of the highest, or intellective
soul.

Pecock calls the five inward bodily wits common

wit, imagination, fantasy, estimation and mind.

The

cmmnon wit presents the sensations received through the
outer senses to the imagination, which in its turn refers
them to the fancy or "fantasy".

The image, in its turn,

is given over to the estlination, or judgment, and then
is presented to the intellect to be loved as Good or
rejected as Evil.

The will is a power by which one

chooses what the reason, or understanding, deems to be
good.

He says in The Donet,
Free will is a power with whiCh may
freely be loved and chosen that thing whiCh
reason knoweth and deemeth to be good--and
which may command to all other witty and
moving powers of the soul and to all members
of the body such moving proper workings as
she wills that they be commanded. 11.

Pecock held that living morally was identical with living
reasonably.

If one lives reasonably, he necessarily lives

according to faith.

Thus reason is the ultimate crite-

rion for action, the guardian and perfecter of conscience.
11.

Phineas Fletcher says that conscience is a

See Note 8.

~

------------------------------------------------.
"servant of the will, contributing to her proper functionin the mind",12· thus making conscience a counselor of the
will rather than of the

~

or understanding.

The gen-

eral belief is that the will is the intellect in action,
and it is the virtue or faculty, joined with rational
apprehension that carries out what the understanding
suggests.

The rational apprehension was called specu-

lative intellect or understanding when it sought truth
by contemplation, and practical intellect, when it sought
good and suggested to the will that the good be accepted
and the evil rejected.

This was the practical judgment

in matters of conduct which is called conscience.
Coeffeteau, a Renaissance writer who describes with
great care and exactness the various passions, says of
the will that it is an appetite, an object of desire.
He says:
To come to the Reasonable Soule; it
hath two principal powers, the one indued
with Knowledge, which is the Understanding;
and the other capable of Desire, which is
the Will; the which being blind as all appetites are naturally, she followeth in the
pursuit of her objects, the light of the
Understanding, by reason whereof she is
called the intellectual appetite, but more
properly the Will. The office of our understanding, particularly of that which we call
possible, is to receive, and in receiving to
know, and in knowing to offer unto the will,
those kinds or forms, which are sent unto it
12.

Phineas Fletcher,
1633, p. 20.

~

Purple Island, Cambridge,

~"----------------------------------------------.
from the Imagination. l3 •
The will, as Coeffeteau explains, is called an
intellectual appetite, because the object of its desire
must be referred to the light of the understanding.

Thus

the will becomes, in his teaching, the connecting link
between the outer world evident to the senses, and the
inner soul of men.
The appetites, referred to so often in medieval psychology, played an important part in influencing conduct;
unless they were controlled by reason they became the
enemy of man's spiritual welfare.

According to theo-

logical writers, the natural appetites were always at
war with the soul, and their solicitings must be turned
aside before a man was free to act according to the dictates of his conscience.

These appetites or desires,

were divided into three classes--the first and lowest
were those which had to do merely with the vegetal soul,
and governed the desire for food and drink; they also
regulated digestion, assimilation, and the other natural
functions of the body.

These appetites or powers had in

themselves, of course, no relation to reasonable conduct.
The second kind of appetite, belonging to the sensitive
13.

F. N. Coeffeteau, A Table of Human Passions With
Their Causes ~ Effects, Translated into English
by Edward Grimeston, London, Nicholas Okes, 1621,
Introduction (no pagination)

~----------------------------------------------~----------,
soul, comprised those inclinations by which the soul
desired that which presented itself as a Good, and rejected or opposed what appeared to it as evil.

These appe-

tites, accordingly, were called concupiscible and irascible, respectively.

Coeffeteau, in A Table of Human

Passions, says:
It was necessary for the good of man,
that he should have two kinds of inclinations,
the one to pursue those things which are pleasing and agreeable to his senses, and to avoid
those which may any way annoy him: and this we
call the concupiscible or desiring power; and
the other, by means whereof he may encounter
and vanquish whatsoever opposeth itself, crosseth his inclinations, or that tends to the
destruction of his being, or the decay of his
contentment, which is that we call the irascible or angry power. 14.
The intellective appetite resides in the rational soul
and it is that virtue or power which covets the good
and hates the evil.

This is really the will working in

conjunction with reason.

The appetites, generally con-

sidered as such, were those desires which reached out
toward sensible good, and the will was that power which
reason urged to reach out toward what it considered good.
Thus will was a servant of the understanding and held a
higher place than the sensitive appetites.

It was the

regulation of will by right reason that constituted the
control of man's actions by his conscience.
14.

Ibid: Introduction

----------------------,

~-.

This correspondence of the understanding and the
will in regulating man's actions, according to Burton,
consists of three degrees or innate "species": synteresis,
or the purer part of the conscience, which consisted in
knowing good or evil; the dicamen rat10nis, Which admonishes us to do good or evil, and the conscience itself,
which approves good or evil, justifying or condemning our
actions.

This.final classification is what we understand
15 • Corresponding to the three divisions or
by conscience.
classes of appetites were three degrees of knowledge: the
knowledge of sense, which resulted in the pleasure of sense;
the knowledge of imagination, which found its fulfillment
in the pleasures of the imagination; and, the knowledge of
the intellect, Which was the highest of man's delights,
and whiCh led finally to love and service of God through
man's reason.

The predominance of one or other of these

types of knowledge in a man was often used in the literature of the times as a means of estimating character.
Right conduct, as determined by reason and urged by
the will, both of Which working in unison constitute the
natural conscience, would be the complete fulfillment of
the rational powers of man, even without revelation.
15.

Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, Bell, London,
1896, pp. 189-190.

But

~----------------------------------------------I
~

another element enters here--the rebellion of the sensitive appetites, the affections and the imagination against
reason.

The affections are motions or impulses of the sen-

sitive appetite, which reach out toward good and reject
evil.

The affections are subjects of the imagination, and

are not entirely within control of the will.

They arise

unbidden at some solicitation of the sensitive appetite.
They therefore to a certain extent limit the power of
reason; they are to be brought as soon as possible under
control so as not to interfere with right conduct.

The

imagination, in all writers of this period, and in ecclesiastical writers of all times, has. been considered a
dangerous faculty, one that must be watched and struggled
against, so that its phantoms may not disturb the reason
and burden the conscience.

The imagination is the faculty

which receives impressions from the external senses.

Then

it acts as a sort of sending station, distributing its impressions immediately to the memory, or to the reason and
the understanding to be deliberated on.

It may send its

message to the heart, the seat of the affections.

Then

the idea is presented to the will, Which decides whether
it is a good or an ill.

But if the imagination has been

allowed to act without the judgment of reason, the lower
powers, the sensitive appetites, will command the will,
and the man will act against his conscience.

~'--------------------------------------.
The affections are milder motions of the sensitive
appetite than are the passions.

The passions are motions

so violent that they disturb man's physical well-being.
This question of the close connection between man's physical nature and his rational and moral nature is one
that finds a prominent place in all the psychology and
ethics of the period.

With this subject is related the

medieval idea of the four humors.

These humors are ele-

ments corresponding to fire, earth, air and water, and
out of them God formed all his Creation.

These elements

in the human body were called melancholy, phlegm, blood
and choler.
viduals.

They varied in quantity and purity in indi-

If a man had these four elements mixed in his

body in the proper proportions, he was near perfection
both in his physical and his moral and reasonable nature.
That one of the elements which predominated over the others
gave to the man his individual characteristics, both physical and moral.

Thus, those men in whom phlegm predomina-

ted were slow and slothful, the sanguine were cheerful
and courageous, the melancholy sorrowful and hard to please,
and the choleric easily provoked to anger and very active.
This psychology of the humors is a descendant of the
teachings of Galen.

It was closely united with the be-

liefs regarding reason and conduct.
The study of the mind could not be

r,-------------------------------.
separated from a study of the body, nor this
from a study of the four elements. 16.
The four humors, as said above, if they are in their
proper proportions tend to the perfection of man.

But

in most instances one or other of the humors is out of
due proportion.

In the same individual, moreover, differ-

ent humors may predominate at different times.

Thus physi-

ological disturbances may throw a man out of his usual
calm or cheerful frame of mind.

This, of course, is to

a certain extent, obviously true.

Also, conversely, a

disturbance in the sensitive soul of man, the soliciting
or rebellion of the passions over reason, may produce a
corresponding disturbance in the body, bringing about
alterations in the animal spirits.
The passions, according to Craig, resulted,
not from any imperfection in the faculties
of the soul, which stood supreme, and, as a divine element, incorruptible, but from physiological conditions which cloud or interfere with
the normal operations of the soul. 17.
The humors of the body became unbalanced by excess, and
reason was disregarded.

Imagination and passion were

allowed to gain the upper hand over reason because reason
was clouded and dulled by intemperance, and imagination,
aided by the paSSions, remained all the more free.
16.
17.

It

Anderson, op.cit. p.lS.
Craig, H. "Shakespeare's Depiction of the Passions",
Philological Quarterly, IV, (1925) p. lS9.

~~---------------------------------.
was the duty of the will to control the appetites through
the judgments of reason, but when the appetites and
passions gained supremacy over the reason, the will became the slave of the passions.

As Senault expresses it:

As long as they (the Passions) are awakened by objects, solicited by the Senses,
and protected by Imagination's self, they
have no other craft than what they draw from
Corrupted Nature! But when the Understanding,
overshadowed by their obscurity or won by
their solicitations, perverts the Will, and
obliges this Sovereign to take upon her the
interest of her Slaves, she makes them guilty
of her sin, she changes their motions into
rebellion, and of the insurrection of a Beast,
makes the fault of a man. It is true, that
when the understanding keeps within the bounds
of duty, and is faithful to the Will, he suppresses their seditions, and reduceth these
Mutinies to obedience; she husbandeth their
humours so well; as taking from all their unruliness, he makes rare and excellent virtues
of them. In this estate they are subservient
to Reason, and defend the party which they
were resolved to fight against. The good or
the evil that may be drawn from them binds us
to consider their nature, to observe their proprieties; and to discover their original, to
the end that, arriving at the exact knowledge
of them, we may make use of them in our affairs. 18.
Thus it is evident that the medieval psychologists
believed that the control of the passions by reason was
essential to right conduct and to the freedom of man's
judgment in matters of conduct--the conscience.

Most

of the philosophers of the period agree as to the
18.

J. F. Senault, The Use of the Passions. Written in
French, but put into-EngIish by Henry, Earl of Monmouth, London. Printed by W. G. for John Sims, 1677,
pp. 16-17.
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extremely close relationship be,tween the soul and the
body, although it was a matter of conjecture as to just
how this came about'.

The passions affected the body,

and the condition of the body had an important bearing
upon the passions of the soul, changing and lessening to
a greater or less degree the supremacy of the reason, and
the freedom of the will.

Another contemporary writer upon

the subject, Thomas Wright, in his book,
the Mind in General,
----

~

Passions of

makes the following statements with

regard to effect of passion upon the humors:
There is no passion very vehement, but
that it alters extremely some of the four
humors of the body, and all physicians commonly
agree that among divers other extrinsical causes
of diseases, one, and not the least, is the
excess of some inordinate passion, for although
it busieth their braines, as also the natural
Philosophers, to explicate the manner how an
operation that lodgeth in the soul can alter the
body, and move the humors from one place to another, yet they consent that it may proceed from
a certain sympathy of nature, a subordination of
one part to another, and that the spirits and
humors wait upon the passions, as their Lords and
Masters. 19.
Another point with regard to the passions that was
accepted generally as an explanation of the modifications
in a man's moral nature in advancing stages of his life
is that which has to do with the difference in the passions that affect man in youth and in old age; and also
19.

Wright, Thomas: The Passions of the Mind in General,
London, 1630, Chapter I, p. 4-.- --

the effect of climate upon the passions.

In youth a man

is influenced strongly by the passions of love and anger.
He is given to acting quickly, with little or no time for
the judgment of reason.

However, he is not covetous, be-

cause he has not had the experience of poverty, and therefore has no desire for earthly goods other than what he
possesses.
Young men are commonly rich in invention,
but poor in matters of judgment; they are fit
for execution but incapable of any great design. 20.
These words by Coeffeteau state other outstanding differences between the characteristics of youth and age, and
indicate what the medieval psychologist would expect with
regard to the steadiness of young men, and the relation
of their actions to cool judgment.

They are most likely

to act impetuously, not heeding the voice of their conscience, particularly in regard to certain vices that depend upon the urgent demands of passion.
To sum up in a few words the origin and development
of the medieval psychological system, especially in regard
to man's actual responsibility for actions:

The system

originated principally with Aristotle, who first taught
the doctrine of the three souls in man; the vegetal soul,
common to all living things, whether plants or animals;
20.

-

Coeffeteau, op.cit., pp. 654-671.
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the sensitive soul, belonging to the lower animals and
to man; and the rational soul, exclusively a quality of
man.

Man is endowed with outer wits--the five senses;

and the inner wits--namely, common wit or sense, imagination or fantasy, estimation or reason, and mind or understanding.

The outer wits presented their sensations to

the inner common sense, where the image was presented
immediately to the imagination, or was referred to the
higher understanding.

The judgment pronounced upon it,

classifying it as good to be loved, or as evil to be rejected.

The will, if it acted freely, and without undue

influence from the imagination, the affections or the
passions, accepted the good and renounced the evil.

The

will was ordained to follow the light of reason and it
would do so, so long as it ruled over the appetites and
governed them by the wisdom it gained from reason.

Reason

was a power by which spiritual things were known, and by
which one might find out what was true or false, good or
bad.

Allied to this power of the higher understanding

was the idea of conscience, a judge of actions and a
counsel of morals.
The psychological system which I have followed from
its sources up to the period with which we are at present
concerned, provides a background for the correct placing
of the Elizabethan theories with regard to the conscience.

Conscience was a judge of morality, powerful as a deterrent to crime when it was joined closely with the higher
reason acting calmly and without influence from passion;
but weak and powerless to guide the actions of a man if
he allowed his will to be controlled by passion rather
than by reason.

Conscience to the Elizabethan was a

definite and powerful force, a voice to be hearkened to
at all costs, the disregarding of which carried with it
its own punishment.

The theory of conscience, applied in

life and also in artistic literature, constituted all the
difference between the tragic hero and the villain, between saints and sinners.

It is not surprising that

Shakespeare, with his highly developed sense of dramatic
values, linked with an almost superhuman insight into
human nature, would seize upon this problem of conscience
when he brings into being with the utmost fidelity to
nature and the supreme perfection of art, the great pageant of characters which are the creation of his genius.

-
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Chapter II.

The Place of Conscience in Elizabethan
Psychology.

The philosophy of the Elizabethans is an outgrowth
of the Medieval system, a bare suggestion of which I have
endeavored to give in the previous chapter.

The intimate

relationship of the study of the mind with that of the
body, the influence of exterior conditions upon conduct,
the extreme importance of the passions in determining
conduct and fixing the degree of praise or blame--are
some of the leading features of Medieval psychology which
were carried over into the Elizabethan.
The Renaissance, especially as it manifested itself
in Italy, was of great importance in changing the outlook
of Elizabethans with regard to moral philosophy, although
the medieval background still remained the bulwark of the
system.

The humanistic movement, applied to all who were

inspired by the new faith in beauty and reason, and who
sought to realize the new exalted hope of humIDl progress,
modified to a great extent man's attitude toward God and
his own soul.

In many instances it proved only a further

incentive to the love and worship of God, because of the
greater appreciation of His gifts, while in others it
had the effect of dulling man's feeling of religion and
making him interested exclusively in the affairs of this
world.

-

The European Renaissance was marked by a boundless
enthusiasm for the newly discovered art and literature
of ancient Greece.

Men were fired by a new resolve to

make the best and not the worst of life upon earth.

They

were ambitious to cultivate as the highest good the idea
of beauty.
The Elizabethan Age, rich as it was in enthusiasm
for extending its knowledge along all lines, and for employing man's capabilities to new and better advantage,
was not likely to be introspective.

The question of man's

relations with his Creator was not by any means uppermost
in his mind.
This secular viewpoint was more marked in England
than in other countries, which felt strongly the influence
of the Renaissance, and it manifested itself remarkably
in the literature of the period.

The medieval philosophy,

influenced as it had been by the humanist movement of the
Renaissance, was still the basis of character portrayal
in artistic literature as in the works on psychology, philosophy and religion; but in many instances, the standards
of conduct were without more than an incidental relationship to God.

The period was by no means consciously ir-

religious; it was enthusiastically and passionately human
in its aims and aspirations.

Of the spirit of this great

age, even in its rather indifferent attitude toward

~~---------------------------------------.
religion, we find perfect expression in the works of
Shakespeare.

We find not the least flaw in his moral

system, but we search in vain for any definite expression
of religious thought, expression or belief.

He believes

whole-heartedly in the dependence of man upon his Maker,
and in his obligation to lead a moral life.

He never

allows, in all his range of characters, that one feel
sympathy for evil done, or that the evil should triumph
for any length of time, but one is bound to acknowledge
that the life upon earth is much more attractive to Shakespeare and to the characters that he has created, than is
any looking forward to another life.
Sir Sidney Lee, in "Foreign Influence on Shakespeare",
thus describes the spirit of the Elizabethan Age:
Elizabethan literature, which was the
noblest manifestation in England of the Renaissance, reached its apotheosis in Shakespeare. It had absorbed all the sustenance
of the new movement--the enthusiasm for the
Greek and Latin classics, the passion for extending the limits of human knowledge, the resolve to make the best and not the worst of life
upon earth, the ambition to cultivate the idea
of beauty, the conviction that man's reason was
given him by God to use without restraint. All
these new sentiments went to the formation of
Shakespeare's work, and found there perfect definition. 21.
Sir Sidney Lee's. comment on the spirit of the age,
21.

-

Sir Sidney Lee, "Foreign Influences on Shakespeare",
in Great Englishmen 2! ~ ~ Century, London,
Constable, 1904, p. 317.

and on Shakespeare's particular expression of it, summarizes Shakespeare's attitude toward Renaissance culture.
His attitude toward religion is expressed by Wyndham
Lewis, who quotes from Bradley as follows:
The Elizabethan drama was almost wholly
secular; and while Shakespeare was writing, he
practically confined his view to the world of
non-theological observation and thought, so
that he represents it substantially in one and
the same way, whether the period of the story
is pre-Christian or Christian. He looked at
this secular world most intently and seriously,
without regard to anyone's hopes, fears or
beliefs. 22.
This does not imply, by any means, that Shakespeare is
unethical in his teaching; it rather suggests that he
has a definite ethical system, if not a theological one.
The ethical system that Shakespeare depicts is, as
has been said before, based upon the philosophy of Aristotle, Christianized and developed by the Church Fathers,
elaborated and systematized to a great degree in the medieval period, and further perfected under Renaissance influence.

One can understand much of Shakespeare's char-

acter portrayal only by constant reference to medieval
psychology.

As he was not a religious man, in the strict

sense of the word, neither was he a philosopher.

He was,

quoting Lewis again,
22.

-

Wyndham Lewis, The Lion and the Fox, London, 1927,
p. 169, (Quoted from Bradley~
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a great and accomodating artist,
accomodating himself, with great suppleness,
but not slavishly--to the life, art and ideas
around him. He was not inclined to any very
strong expression of belief, although within
that receptive frame he displays very much
more passion and prejudice than is generally
allowed. Nevertheless, that the framework
was opf,ortunist, accomodating, and in that
sense 'unoriginal ~t is evident. And it is in
that sense that he was "impersonalll--a particularly glorious parasite on everything. 23.
Shakespeare made use in his plays of the psychology
of his contemporaries, as Miss Anderson says:
His psychology was a crude explanation of
observable facts, based on the science of the
Middle Ages and motivated in its development
by a desire to understand the functioning of
the soul for the better regulation of conduct. 24 •
One of the fundamental principles of Elizabethan ethics
was the belief that the faculties of the soul must be
kept under strict control, so that they might not r.ebel
against reason.

The will must unite with reason to com-

mand the soul to act well, but as soon as the will turns
against reason and becomes a slave of the passions, the
conscience is no longer obeyed, and the sovereignty of
the reason is destroyed.

~Vhen

the senses and the imagina-

tion join forces to entice the affections, then the will
is drawn toward the affections and away from reason.
Right thinking and right doing spring
23.
24.

Ibid: p. 152.
Anderson, op.cit., p. 155.
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alike from the supremacy of the intellect,
understanding and will, but usually imagination determines thought, and the affections
control action. 25.
The mind must work through the senses.

Therefore it is

evident that frequently the lower nature of man gains the
ascendancy over the higher, and the conscience, which is
the will working in conjunction with the reason to bring
good actions, is not heeded.
The control of the will by reason, and the correct
balance in the powers of the soul that brings about temperance and virtue and the joy of a good conscience, are
governed to a considerable extent by psysiological conditions, by a preponderance of certain humors in the body,
by bodily imperfections and deformities.

A good man's

conscience is to be relied upon to judge properly of his
actions, but a man who is bad by ttcomplexion", by nature,
by environment, or by the influence of climate, finds it
very difficult to hear the voice of his conscience, because his actions are naturally bad.

By persistent ef-

forts these natural tendencies may be overcome, but it
is almost impossible for education or philosophy or religion to counteract the effects of naturally evil propensities.

In these persons, conscience is almost entirely

deadened, but we find it in some instances making itself
25.

-
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note, p. 139.

felt when the wicked person has in some way lost control

oi his

exterior senses, as in sleep; as in the case of

King Richard and of Lady Macbeth.
Some specific problems with regard to conscience are
met with in the Elizabethan psychology of revenge.
The most definite statement of the whole
problem of evil was made for the Renaissance
in one of the moral essays of Plutarch, the
philosopher, who, although a Pagan, was able
to guide moral teaching. The treatise was
published in 1603, among the Morals translated by Philemon Holland. The second answer
is the one which seems most clearly to have
been accepted by Shakespeare, for it affirms
that sin brings inevitably its own punishment
to the heart and conscience of the sinner:
but wickedness engendering within itself (I
wot not What) displeasure and punishment, not
after a sinful act is committed, but even at
the very instant of committing, it beginneth
to suffer pain due to the offence; neither is
there a malefactor, but when he seeth others
like himself punished beareth forth his own
cross; whereas mischievous wickedness frameth
of her self the engines of her own torment,
as being a wonderful artisan of a miserable
life, which (together with shame and reproach)
hath in it lamentable calamities, many terrible
frights, fearful perturbations and passions of
the spirit, remorse of conscience, desperate
repentance, and continued troubled and unquietness. 26.
Miss Campbell traces the Renaissance idea of tragedy
from the medieval idea.

It was chiefly concerned with an

explanation that could justify the ways of God to men.
It came to seek the justice which must inhere in the fall
26.

Lily B. Crunpbell, Shakespeare's Tragic Heroes,
Slaves of PaSSion, Cambridge, 1930, p. 21.

of princes (which in the beginning was the chief subject
of tragedy) if there was a God of justice.

And it found

that justice in the error or the folly which caused men
to bring down evil upon themselves.

Tragedy came to

stress more and more the teaching of Renaissance philosophy,
that the man sins who would undertake to execute privately
the justice of God.

God will Himself execute justice

through calamity visited upon the sinner; or through justice executed by the magistrates as His agents; (in the
case of Hamlet, he was appointed by God as a magistrate
to execute His justice.)

Sometimes God executes justice

through the troubled heart and uneasy conscience which
are the penalty of sin, as in the case of Richard III.

An important distinction, in this study of conscience,
is to be made between the tragic hero and the villain.
The tragic hero sins under the influence of passion.

He

hears the warnings of conscience, but the will is perverted, and does not join with reason.

In the case of the

villain, the passions have so long held the mastery over
the reason, that the reason itself coldly chooses evil.
Miss Lily Campbell thus explains the distinction between
a tragic hero and a villain:
Passion might cloud the understanding
so that judgment could not be well made, or
might sway the will by impetuous summons,
and thus lead to sin that brought evil upon
innocent and quiet. alike.

Passion might be so excessive that
reason would be, through the effect of passion on the humors, altogether lost. Thus
no moral judgment could be given.
But that is not to say that the effect
of passion in bringing on these abnormal
states of unreason was not bringing about its
own punishment.
Finally, however, passion might pervert
the will, so that it maliciously willed that
which it \nlled. Reason was itself perverted
in such a case, and the sin became mortal.
The tragic hero sins under the influence
of passion, his reason failing to Check his
passion. His passion may lead him to madness,
but as long as his passion is in conflict with
reason, he has not committed mortal sin. \~n,
however, passion has taken possession of his
will, has perverted his will, when, in perfect
accord with passion, his reason directs evil
through the will, then we have a villain, one
who is dyed in sin, one whose sin is mortal. 27.
The great majority of moral and philosophical writers
of the period lay stress upon the influence of the passions
in perverting the will and blinding the judgment in such
a way as to weaken man's moral responsibility and stifle
the voice of his conscience.

Conscience acting in itself,

without any undue influence from the passions or the affections, will guide a man truly and safely; but the
moral judgment is warped and distorted by passion to such
a degree as to be no longer a reliable guide.

Reason

must be allowed to rule supreme if a man is to act safely
27.

-

Campbell, op.cit., p. 101.
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in accord with his conscience; any departure from reason
is dangerous.

A noble and virtuous character will be-

come vicious if he lets his heart and his imagination
blind his intellect.

A man is truly honest and virtuous

if he follows nature, that is to say (according to Charron)
if he acts in accordance with right reason. 28 •
Charron continues,
And the applauses, and joys, and transports of a good conscience, as they are sure
to us, and cannot be withered by any who envy
our virtue or our fame; so are they likewise,
so large and full, so generous and noble, and
sufficient, as may very well encourage, and
satisfy us, during our continuance in this
present world. 29 •
He insists also upon the influence that complexion and
climate have upon a person's actions, and declares that
those men that are good naturally have not the same
claim to the praise and honor of their fellovrraen, as
those who, to become good, must act in a manner contrary
to their natural disposition; these last alone, he says,
are truly virtuous.

This doctrine of the difficulty that

a man has to overcome natural tendencies is referred to
again and again in Shakespeare, and the influence of
man's surroundings and his Itcomplexion" are frequently
referred to as palliating excuses for crime or at least
for irregular conduct.
28.
29.

Thus Othello acts as he does

Charron, Pierre, Of Wisdom, Translated by G. Stanhope,
London, 1763, p. 64.
Ibid: p. 75.

because of his complexion.

That natural tendencies may

be overcome is also subscribed to frequently in Shakespeare;
as for instance, when Hamlet says,
For use almost can change the stamp
of nature. 30.
Thus one sees that right conduct was a matter of the proper restraint of the affections and the imagination--a
true temperance which would give to the judgment its deserved freedom, and which would incline the will to accept
the dictates of reason rather than the lower solicitations
of the imagination and the passions.
the reason was more or less under

This supremacy of

n~n's

control, but a

body in which there was an ill proportion of elements
and humors inclined the soul to evil, and interfered with
the freedom of the will, although it did not contradict
or render it void.

Vices consist not in our faculties,

but in our habits, and our habits depend upon our will;
and it is therefore the fault of our will that we are evil,
and not originally of our nature.

The will was responsi-

ble for action; the Elizabethans insist upon this, but
they again and again point out how difficult it is to
overcome natural tendencies.

Thus it followed that the

conquering of evil tendencies was a mark of nobility of
character.
30.

Hamlet, III, 4, 168.
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In considering the power of a man's conscience to
influence him to perform good deeds or to refraining
from evil ones, it is important to study the various
sorts of wicked persons, with reference to the hold that
evil has upon them.

Charron thus describes lithe three

sorts of wicked persons. II
Some, first, are perfectly incorporated
with evil, they reason themselves into it;
their resolutions and the whole bend of their
wills are fixed entirely in its interests; or
else long custom hath got such a perfect mastery over them that they cannot disengage
themselves. These miserable wretches are utterly abandoned; their very understanding is
vitiated, sees, consents to, and approves the
evil; and this is usually the case, when vice
and debauchery meet with a strong and vigorous
mind, and hath taken such deep root in it~
that it comes at last to. be naturalized, and
of a piece with it; all the faculties are tinctured, it is corrupted throughout, and vice so
closely interwoven, as to become a part of its
temper and constitution. Others, secondly,
have their intervals of folly only; they are
wicked now and then by fits, just as any violent gush of a temptation disturbs or puts
them out of their course; as some impetuous
passion drives them headlong upon the rocks;
so that these men are surprised, and carried
away forcibly, by a current too strong for
them to stem. The third sort are betwixt
these two extremes. They have a right notion
of vice, considered in itself; and when they
reflect upon their fault abstractedly, do
sincerely accuse and condemn themselves for
it; and thus they differ from the first sort,
who are advanced even to the desperate degree
of even a good liking for wickedness. But
then they have not the violence or surprise of
passions or temptations to qualify and extenuate their crime; and in this respect they
differ from the second sort, too. But these
men go to work in cold blood, and with great

deliberation; they weigh circumstances, and
drive a bargain as it were; observe well the
heinousness of the sin; and put the pleasure
or profit it brings into the contrary scale;
and thl1S they barter away their souls, and
are content to be wicked at a certain price,
and for such as they think a valuable consideration. 31.
Continuing his discussion of ,the three sorts of wicked
men, Charron introduces us to another phase or application of the conscience--that which condemns us after a
wicked action is perforraed.

He says:

Now the first of these three sorts are
past repenting by ordinary means, and nothing
less than an unusual and almost miraculous
impression from heaven can reclaim them. For
they are past feeling and commit evil even
with greediness. Besides, the understanding
is brought over to an approbation of the thing;
and so all sense of remorse must be lost, which
proceeds chiefly from acting against our better
judgment; the soul is entirely corrupted, the
distinctions of good and evil obliterated and
worn away; and consequently the will can be
under no solicitude to restrain or refuse. The
third sort of men, though they may appear in
some measure to repent, and condemn themselves,
yet in reality, and properly speaking, they
do not. Take the fact by itself, but view it
dressed up in all its gay attire, with all the
circumstance of pleasure and profit, that recommend and set it off and you shall find them
of another opinion. They think the advantage
of their sin a sufficient compensation for
their guilt; and cannot be said to repent of
that, which had the full and free consent of
their reason and conscience. So that in truth
the second sort seem to be the only persons
that are seriously concerned to repent and reform. 32 .
31.

32.

Charron, op.cit., pp. 76-77.
Ibid: pp. 77-78.
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Related to this idea of the accusing conscience,
WDich brings about in some the purpose of amendment, is
the idea of despair--a passion by which the soul is made
to desist from following after that which it is impossible to obtain.

A man may be so steeped in vice that

his conscience, active enough in the early part of his
wicked career, becomes no longer his accuser; or if it
does accuse him, he turns a deaf ear to its solicitations, with the explanation that there is no further
hope for him.

We see this in rl.lacbeth, who says,

I am in blood steppfd in so far that,
Should I wade no more,
Returning were as tedious as go ofer. 33.
The effect of despair upon a man may be of opposite
kinds: he may acquire by it a sort of false boldness,
as in the case of Macbeth; or it may make its victim
weak and fearful, as in the case of Claudius.
Another application of the term conscience is found
in the term a "good conscience", one that praises a man
for actions well performed; this joy of a good conscience
is referred to by Charron in the following words:
To the composition of an easy and
quiet mind, two ingredients are indispensably requisite. The first, and indeed
the chief, is a clear and good conscience;
which does inspire men with wonderful
strength and assurance; and is a mighty
33.Macbeth, III, 4, 135-7.

stay and defence, and support, in all manner
of contingencies--let a man be never so stout,
and a stranger to fear, yet if he be not a
good man, and his conscience cannot speak peace
to him--he will never be capable of this happy
tranquillity of spirit, this perfection and
fruit of wisdom, which we are at present treating of. 34.
La Primaudaye, another French moralist who was well knov'ln
in England during the Elizabethan period, and whose book
on

~

French Academie, was a sort of compendium of natu-

ral and moral philosophy, gives a clear, although quaint
and naive, explanation of the theory of conscience, and
of the relation that the will should have with the higher
part of man rather than the lower.

He says:

Seeing God hath placed the heart between
the head and the belly, the vital virtue of
the "Soul between the nutritive, and the will
between the understanding and the most sensual
part in us; therefore the heart, affections
and will ought to look always on high and not
downward, to the end they should join to the
most noble, celestial and divine part, and
not to that which is most base, sensual, and
earthly. 35.
True it is, that the he'art and will often
deceive themselves in the choice and election
of that 'Which is good, whether it be that
following reason and judgment corrupted, which
should show what is good, they embrace their
error; or whether it be that will being corrupted of itself through sin, letteth loose
the bridle against the judgment of reason,
and so suffereth herself to be carried headlong by her evil affections, in following
34.
35.

Charron, op.cit., p. 250.
La Primaudaye, Peter, ~ French Acag.emie, London,
Thomas Adams, 1618, p. 511.

some false show of good. Whereupon it commonly
cometh to pass, that instead of joy, which the
heart should receive of good, unto which the
will tendeth naturally, it receiveth great sorrow and griefs after knowledge taken of the
fault. 36.
.
All the children of Adam are endued with
reason and understanding, and have the knowledge of good and evil engraven and engrafted
in their conscience. There is no man--that
hath not some effect and sparks of this light
of life. But this is not enough to make man
possess the true peace of conscience--the spirit
of the same word of God. The kingdom of heaven
is at hand. We shall understand and know what
our celestial inherit~ce is. We shall obtain
a certain testimony in our consciences of the
difference between being the children of God
and the children of the devil. 37.
La Primaudaye in another place warns us against "custom
in sinning", remarking that custom stills the voice of
conscience, and he gives a striking explanation of the
"furies" that were believed to be supernatural agencies
appointed to torment the wicked.

He says that they are

nothing else but the torments of an evil conscience.
In the above passages we see that La Primaudaye
accepted nearly the same doctrine as Charron with regard
to the three classes of wicked men, and also with regard
to a man whose conscience gives him true peace.
As a final summing up of the Elizabethan doctrine
of conscience, we may say that it is a development of the
medieval, with some changes brought about by Renaissance
36.
37.

Ibid: p. 467.
Ibid: pp. 866-7.
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influence, as for exruaple, the lessening of the importance of the rewards or punisbments of a future life as
a sanction for actions.

The theory of conscience was

based upon the close relationship of the three souls or
faculties in man, and the correspondence of man's soul
with outer circumstances.

An important consideration

was the classification of sinners into three classes or
types--those Who were surprised into sinning, those who
were so blinded by passion that the reason lost control
of the will; and those who were deliberately evil.

Fi-

nally the Elizabethan moralists and psychologists refer
aga:in and again to the easily moved or influenced conscience, and to the joy of a good conscience, together
with its ability to give to the man who possesses it all
the tranquillity and peace of true wisdom.
According to many modern students of Shakespeare
psychology and moral philosophy, the conscience was a
faculty which was governed, not so much by a man's moral
principles, as by passing sensations.

Hence it was likely

to change rapidly with changing circmnstances, and with
changing physiological conditions.

The passions, which

often gained control of the will, and thus deprived
reason of its sovereignty, and with it, the conscience,
which was reason applied for a certain purpose, changed
with changes in the elements, and the

hlli~ors

of the body.

According to Craig, the passions result not from any
imperfection of the faculties of the soul, which stands
supreme, and, as a divine element, incorruptible, but
from physiological conditions, which cloud or interfere
with the normal operations of the soul.

He continues:

Numerous illustrations of the power of
passion can be found in Shakespeare's plays,
and also of Shakespeare's familiarity with
the theory of the passionB. So universally
and so deeply does the consciousness of
correlated mental and bodily states enter
into the expression of thought and feeling,
that it may be said to constitute a principal
basis of Shakespeare's realism, and to be a
chief means by Which he appeals to human feelings. 38.

38.

"Shakespeare's Depiction of the Passions tl , in
Philological Quarterly, Vol. IV, (1925) pp. 191-3.
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Chapter III.

The Problem of Conscience as Studied
in Some of the Plays of Shakespeare.

Before taking up specific conscience problems
in the plays of Shakespeare, some general observations
may be made, which apply to the whole moral problem
as handled by the great dramatist.
As has been said before, many students of Shakespeare have come to the conclusion that he was not
strictly a philosopher, surely not consciously a moralist, but there is no denying the fact that we find in
the plays a definite moral system.

If we deny that he

was a philosopher or psychologist, we cannot refuse
him the honor of being the greatest observer of human
nature that has ever lived.

Perhaps he did not study

and portray psychology as a science, but he understood
it practically, as few men have done.

And as the age

in which he lived was an age of awakened enthusiasm for
all sorts of knowledge, ancient and new, we find all
this exemplified in the works of the great artist, who
steadily and surely "held the mirror up to nature.fI
His ability to picture the full and complete life of
the world about him is expressed by Taylor in the following words:
In some way each Elizabethan expresses

some phase of the contemporary world, and
Shakespeare the impression of the universal
whole. It is himself that he expresses
through the universality of his illumination,
or in any casual borrowing; he, a sheer playwright, making plays for the theater, follow.:Lng this business, inevitably expresses
himself, and through himself the enlightenment and genius of his age. 39.
Shakespeare undoubtedly looked at life from the
outside.

He interpreted human life in his great char-

acters from the viewpoint of the spectator.

His ethics

are built upon human life as it then was; and if one
is to judge correctly of the morality of the characters,
one must remember the period and the audience for which
the characters were created.

This makes all the more

forceful the conclusion that Shakespeare's ethics are
essentially valid and right, since his characters
seem as true to life now as they must have been to
Shakespeare's own audiences.
According to many modern students of Shakespeare
psychology and moral philosophy, the conscience was a
faculty which was governed, not so much by a man's
moral principles, as by passing sensations.

Hence it

was likely to change rapidly with changing circumstances.

39.

Miss Anderson elucidates this theory.

Taylor, ££. cit.

She

p. 218.

I.

~'

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - l

says that the ready response of the mind to reports
from the senses makes of conscience a fleeting thing,
yielding quickly to ,a new stimulus. 40.

The conscience,

according to this statement, woul'd not be a fixed means
of

jud~aent,

but rather an instrument of the passions.

This is illustrated in many passages, for instance in
the second murderer, in Richard III:
Sec. Murd.
First Murd.
Sec. Murd.

First Murd.
Sec. Murd.
'F'I'rst Murd.
Sec. Murd.

First Murd.
Sec. Murd.
First Murd.
Sec. IVIurd.
First IVIurd.
Sec. Murd.
First Murd.
Sec. Murd.
First Murd.

40.
"

The urging of that word "judgment U
hath bred a kind of remorse in me.
What, art thou afraid?
Not to kill him, having a warrant
for it; but to be damned for killing him, from which no warrant can
defend us.
I thought thou hadst been resolute.
So I am, to let him live.
Back to the Duke of Gloucester, tell
him so.
I pray thee, stay awhile; I hope my
holy humour will change; 'twas wont
to hold me but while one would tell
twenty.
How dost thou feel thyself now?
Faith, some certain dregs of conscience are still within me.
Remember our reqard, when the deed is
done.
Zounds, he dies; I had forgot the
revvard.
\¥hereis thy conscience now?
In the Duke of Gloucester's purse.
So when he opens his purse to give
us our reward, thy conscience flies
out.
Let it go; there's few or none will
entertain it.
How if it comes to thee again?

Anderson, 2£. cit.

p. 93.

Sec. Murd.

I'll not meddle with it; it is a
dangerous thing, it makes a man
a coward; a man cannot steal but
it accuseth him ••• ; and every man
that means to live well, endeavors
to trust to himself, and live without it. 41.

This sudden deposing of conscience from its throne
as judge and controller of man's actions is typical of
ignorant and unprincipled men; conscience loses its
force when it counsels against the passions.

We find

this same attitude ·t;oward the conscience in the debate between Launcelot's conscience and the fiend, in
the Merchant of Veniceo
Laun. Certainly my conscience will serve
me to run from this Jew my master. The fiend
is at mine elbow and tempts me saying to me
'Gobbo, Launcelot Gobbo, good Launcelot', or
'good Gobbo' or 'good Launcelot Gobbo, use
your legs take the start, run away'. My
conscience says 'No; ,take heed, honest Launcelot; take heed, honest Gobbo; or, as aforesaid, honest Launcelot Gobbo; do not run, scorn
~~nning with thy heels. '. Well, the most courageous fiend bids me pack; 'Via! " says the
fiend; 'Away!', says the fiend; for the heavens,
rouse up a brave mind1 says the fiend; and run!
Well, my conscience, hanging about the neck of
my heart, says very wisely to me, 'My honest
friend, Launcelot, being an honest man's son,
or rather an honest woman's son;' for, indeed,
my father did something smack, something grow
to, he had a kind of taste; well, my conscience
says 'Launcelot, budge not.'
'Budge', says the
fiend.
'Budge not', says my conscience.
'Conscience', say I, 'you counsel well'. 'Fiend',
say I, 'you counsel well'; to be ruled by my
conscience, I should stay with the Jew, my

l _____
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master, who, God save the mi"_rk, is a kind
of devil; and to run away from the Jew, I
should be ruled by the fiend, who, saving
your reverence, is the devil himself.
Certainly the Jew is the very devil in carnal; and, in my conscience, my conscience
is but a kind of hard conscience, to offer
to counsel me to stay with the Jew. The
fiend gives the more friendly counsel. I
will run, fiend; m~2heels are at your command; I will run.
•
True, this speech is a sort of burlesque upon the
theory of the solicitations of the lower nature against
the conscience; nevertheless, it is authentic according to the Elizabethan psychology of the passions and
affections warring against the reason.

In this in-

stance the desires of Launcelot are personified in the
fiend.

~lis

situation, the fiend tempting man against

his conscience, was familiar to medieval and Renaissance
audiences.

The fiend as a visible force for evil was

an integral part of morality plays, and he was retained
in many of the later dramas.
The words "My conscience, hanging about the neck
of my heart", bear directly upon the theory that the
conscience, a counsellor of the. understanding, is opposed to the affections, whose principal seat is in
the heart.

Launcelot argues with his conscience,

and his passions, in the person of the fiend, get the
better of his judgment.
42.

In this instance, reflection

Merchant of Venice, II, 3, 1-34

was an enemy to right conduct; this is unusual in
Shakespeare.

Miss Anderson points this out in dis-

cussing the relation of the tragic hero to his conscience.

She cites especially the case of Hamlet, and

shows that it was his "thinking too precisely of the
event" that prevented the accomplis.hment of what he was
morally certain was a duty imposed by Heaven.

Many of

the wicked characters speak against deliberation; Macbeth knows that
Lf it were done when 'tis done,
then 'twere well
43
It were done quickl-y.
•
Richard III says that "fearful connnenting is a leaden
servitor."

King Claudius, for fear deliberation will

cool Laertes' purpose of revenge, urges him to act against Hamlet immediately.

These men are afraid to give

their conscience an opportunity to gain control over
their actions.

These men who speak against deliberation,

in many instances also exhibit a fear of conscience,
Sometimes the conscience is blamed as a weakening influence, " devised to keep the strong in awe. " 44.
It "makes cowards of us all."
If a man desires hasty action, performed without
deliberation, he is not a good man, according to

43.
44.

Macbeth, I, 7, 1-2.
Hamlet, III, 1, 81.

Elizabethan standards.

If a man does anything without

considering upon it, he is not to be called virtuous.
He must give the judgment time to pass upon it before
he acts.

Shakespeare's good men, rather than finding

in conscience a hindrance to brave deeds, as do the
villains, rely upon it to make them moderate, but withal
strong and courageous.

Oxford, in Richard

l!l

finds

that his conscience helps him to advance bravely against
his enemy.
:Every man's conscience is a
thousand men to fight ag~inst
that bloody homicide. 45.
Malcolm, also, indicates his realization of the power
of deliberation to prevent rash and wicked deeds, when
he says to Macduff,
. And modest wisdom plucks me
From over-credulous haste. 46.
Richard III presents interesting problems of conscience.
Richard belongs to the first of Charron's "classes of
wicked men."

He is perfectly incorporated with evil,

and his very understanding approves the evil.

Moulton

says that Richard was evil for the sake of being
evil. 47.

He had built up carefully an assertion of

individual will against the order of the universe.
o~dinary

45.
46.
47.

All

restraints he had learned to cast off-sympathy,

Richard III, V, 2, 18-19.
Macbeth, IV, 3, 120-121.
R. G. Moulton, Moral System of Shakespeare, Macmillan
Co. N. Y. 1903, pp. 43-44.·.

inherited affections, remorse; his position seemed
impregnable.

But he forgot that there are conditions

under which the will is unable to act, and these are
found, not in some remote combination of unlikely circwas~ances,

but in the most commonplace of every-day

conditions--sleep.

During sleep, when his faculties are

not under the control of his will, his conscience, kept
so strictly in abeyance during his waking hours, and
apparently dead, directs the procession of his victims,
which appear and torture him with the remembrance of his
wicked deeds.

As each ghost appears and says in turn,

"Let me sit heavy on thy soul tomorrow,1I and bids him
despair, Richard's imagination, even in sleep, is
roused against his will, and his conscience accuses him
of the hatefulness of his crimes.

When he awakes, he

is unaole immediately to gain control of his imagination,
and his conscience is still free to condemn him.

Then

follows the dialogue between his two selves--the suppressed self of inherited humanity, and the artificial
callousness so painfully built up.
Have mercy, Jesut Softt I did but dream.
o coward conscience, how dost thou afflict met
The lights burn blue. It is now dead midnight.
Cold fearful drops stand on my trembling flesh.
What do I fear? myself? there's none else by:
Richard loves Richard; that is, I am I.
Is there a murderer here? No. Yes, I am;
rrhen fly. What, from myself? Great reason, why:
Lest I revenge. What, myself upon myself?

Alack, I love myself. 'Wherefore? for any good
That I myself have done unto myself?
0, no! I rather hate myself
For hateful deeds committed by myself!
I am a villain: yet I lie, I am not.
Fool, of thyself speak well: fool, do not flatter.
I',:y conscience hath a thousand several tongues,
And every tongue brings in a several tale,
And every tale condemns me fo~ a villain.
Perjury, perjury, in the high'st degree;
Murder, stern murder, in the direst degree;
All several sins, all used in each degree,
Throng to the bar, crying all, Guilty! guilty!
I shall despair.
There is no creature loves me;
And if I die, no soul shall pity me:
Nay, wherefore should they, since that I myself
Find in myself no pity to myself?
Methought the souls of all that I had murdertd
Came to my tent; and everyone did threat
Tomorrow's vengeance on the head of Richard." 48.
Richard is an illustration of another Elizabethan
theory of conduct--the agreement between outer circumstances and appearances, and inward morality.

This theory

came down from Plato, who taught that beauty of person
should go with beauty of

so~)l.

Richard, because he was

"curtailed of fair proportion,
Cheated of feature by dissembling nature
Deform'd, unfinish'd 49.
since he could not prove a lover, was determined to become a villaj.n.

Because Richard was born outside the

pale of normal humanity, his trend was toward evil,
since nature had already started him in that direction,
and he franldy made choice of wickedness.

f

48.
49.

Richard III, V, 3, 177-206.
Ibid: I, 1, 18, 19.

His conscience

would remain, as we have seen, under control of this
wicked will, until the power of the will was removed.
Queen Margaret, in pronouncing her fearful curse
upon Richard, says also that he was,
sealed in his nativity
The slave of nature and the son of hellJ
and she asks that the worm of conscience should begnaw
his soul, and that his dreams should be disturbed with
hideous visions.

This curse, so fearfully fulfilled,

was part of that theory of retribution which we find
exemplified in the plays.
A question that Moul ton suggests with regard to
this retribution is that at first appearance it does
not seem sufficiently spectacular to provide sufficient
retribution for the many open crimes of Richard.

It

seems that he is permitted to die rather quietly, and
is not held up to the scorn of his enemies.

Moulton

explains the justice of this by saying that a spectacular death would have been a moment's pang and all would
have been over, but as it

was~

the death that he suf-

fered was neither quick and showy eno'J.gh to give to his
memory the added distinction of bravery, nor slow enough
to arouse the sympathy of the reader.

50.

Ibid: I, 3, 225-226.

We are left to

conjecture the manner of his death, and the tortures
of conscience which must have overwhelmed him at
the end.
The Renaissance idea of tragedy--the justice which
must inhere in the fall of princes, if there is a God
of justice--is exemplified in Richard by the uneasy
conscience which will not let him sleep in peace, and
by the error which caused him to bring down evil upon
himself.

He is a true example of Renaissance villain,

one who is so by free choice, who loves evil as a recomgense for the lack of love which he finds in his
fellow men, and whose will is so perverted that it is
in perfect accord with passion,--who can feel no remorse which will bring about repentance and amendment,
but who suffers, nevertheless, the intense pangs of a
trou.bled and abused conscience.
The character of Richmond gives us an example of
another sort of conscience, that "clear and good conscience" which Charron praises as the
source of wonderful strength and
assurance, and of a happy tranqu~llity of
spirit. 51.
In his sleep the ghosts of Richard's victims address

51.

See Note 34.

Richmond as "Quiet, untroubled soul", and promise
that God and good angels will fight on his side; and
upon waking, he tell his friends that he has had
the sweetest sleep and fairest boding
dreams
That ever enter1d in a drowsy head. 52.
He has the peace of a good conscience, and even in
sleep his imagination, governed strongly by reason during his waking hours, is kept under control.

Richard,

on the contrary, is tormented in sleep by the imagination
which he has made subservient to his wicked passions
while his will was able to control it.
An example of the power of passion upon conscience
is found in the quick conversion of Anne to the side of
Richard.

As Richard himself says:

I, that kill'd her husband and his
father,
To take her in her heart's extremest hate,
With curses in her mouth, tears in her eyes,
The bleeding witness of her hatred by;
Having God, her conscience, and these bars
against me,
And I nothing to back my suit at all
But the plain devil and dissembling looks,
And yet to win her, all the world to nothingl 53.
The passions of the Lady Anne are immediately and
violently roused by the flattery of Richard, and the
will, turning aside from the sovereign reason to which
R2.
53.

Richard III, 5, 3, 227-228.

li!.~~ici

TIl,

1, 2, 231-239.
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it owes allegiance, and from which it will derive the
greatest good, becomes an ally to the passions, and Anne
through her own act is made another victim of Richard.
In Clarence, in Richard III, we find an illustration
of another of Charron's "three sorts of wicked men."

He

acknowledges, when he has been frightened by his fearful
dream, that he has committed all the crimes of which he
is accused in sleep, and he repents.

La Primaudayets

theory that the furies which torment wicked men are merely
the torments of a guilty conSCience, is also illustrated
here, when
came wandering by
A shadow like an angel, with bright hair
Dabbled in blood; and he squeak'd out aloud,
"Clarence is come; false, fleeting, perjured Clarence,
That stabb'd me in the field of Tewksbury;
Seize on him, Furries, take him to your torments!" 54.
The play of Richard II, offers some striking examples
of the Renaissance theory of retribution--that Heaven
always defends the right, and punishes the guilty by the
tortures of conscience.

This is true in the case of

Richard, whom his courtiers refUse to punish for Gloucester's death, but who assures the duchess that heaven will
revenge.
But since correction lieth in those
hands
\Vhich made the fault that we cannot correct,
54.

Richard III, I, 4, 53-57.

Put we our quarrel to the wil~ of heaven. 55.
Gaunt refuses to avenge Gloucester's death, because
he has so great respect for "the divinity that hedges a
king", that he may not raise his hand against him, but
promises the duchess that her husband's death will indeed
be avenged:
God's in the quarrel; for God's substitute,
His deputy anointed in His sight,
Hath caus'd his death: the ~ich if wrongfully,
Let heaven revenge; for I may never lift
An angry arm against His minister. 56.
This idea of the "divinity" of a king is further
emphasized after the death of Richard, who, although he
had been deposed, had still about him the aura of kingship.

His executioner, Exton, was "stricken with the

prick of a guilty conscience" although he had been commissioned to perform the deed by the highest authority of the
land.

o would the deed were good!
For now the devil, that told me I did well,
Says that this deed is chronicled in hell. 57.
This peculiar expression with regard to the devil, implies
the doctrine sometimes expressed of a good and an evil
conscience; the good conscience inspiring to virtuous
deeds, and the evil, to wicked deeds.
55.
56.
57.

Richard II, I, 2, 4-6.
Ibid: I, 2, 37-39.
Ibid: V, 5, 115-117.

Richard II dies considering himself a severely
wronged and innocent man.

He has reasoned himself into

the belief so generally accepted in medieval times that
"the king can do no wrong ll •

He is the contrary of those

villains who reason themselves into evil, with the direct
intent of committing evil for its own sake, as in Richard

-III.

In Measure for Measure, a play which, according to

Coleridge, is the central expression of Shakespeare's
moral judgments, the character of Angelo gives a striking
example of the conscience suddenly transformed by passion.
Shakespeare wrote this playas a protest against the narrow
and fanatical Puritanism which hated his art, and which
condemned and punished inexorably all human frailties,
especially those of the flesh.

The play is an expression

of Shakespeare's wrath against moral hypocrisy and selfrighteousness.

Still Angelo is not a thorough, natural

hypocrite; he is an excellent illustration of the power
of passion to upset even the most firmly established moral
jUdgments.

Angelo is a self-deceiver.

that he is what he appears to be.

He sincerely thinks

He is amazed and con-

founded at the sudden passion which the presence of Isabel
awakens in him.

He is one of that type of wicked men who

are surprised into wickedness, according to Charron.

His

mind is not settled and grounded in sin; rather he sets

himself up as a pattern and enforcer of virtue.

He for-

gets that he himself is frail, and is so proud that he
thinks he is beyond the reach of temptation.

When Isabel

appears before him, and demands of him:

Go to your bosom:
Knock there, and ask your heart
know
That's like my brother's fault:
A natural guiltiness such as is
Let it not sound a thought u~on
Against my brother's life. 58.

what it doth
if it confess
his,
your tongue

Angelo, who has been suddenly aroused by her virtue and
beauty, says aside,
She speaks, and 'tis
Such sense, that my sense breeds with it. 59.
acknowledging to himself that his sense--that is, his
senses, are inflamed by her.

When she has left him, he

exclaims against the temptation that has so overwhelmed
him, making him yield to desires which he had before
scorned, thinking that his lofty virtue was beyond the
reach of such solicitations.

His pride and his hypocrisy

were his downfall.
From thee,--even from thy virtue!
What's this, what's this? Is this her fault or
mine?
The tempter or the tempted, who sins most?
Hal

Not she; nor doth she tempt: but it is I
That, lying by the violet in the sun,
Do, as the carrion does, not as the flower,
Corrupt with virtuous season. 60.
58.
59.
60.

Measure for Measure, II, 2, 138-141.
Ibid: 142-143.
IbId: II, 2, 162-170.

~Vhat, do I love her,
That I desire to speak to her again,
And feast upon her eyes? vVhat is't I dream on?
o cunning enemy, that, to catch a saint,
With saints dost bait thy hook! Most dangerous
Is that temptation that doth goad us on
To sin in loving virtue. 61.

The above lines show how completely Angelo is under
the influence of passion.

His conscience makes a correct

pronouncement, but his will is under the control of his
passions rather than his reason, and he, who was proud
of his virtue, becomes sinful.

He says again:

I have begun,
And now I give my sensual race the rein:
Fit thy consent to my sharp appetite. 62.
His sensual appetites have entirely taken possession of
him.

When Isabel says to the Duke:
He would not, but by gift of my chaste
body
To his concupiscible intemperate lust,
Release my brother; 63.

She uses language appropriate to the psychology of the
time, in placing lust among the concupiscible passions, as
is done by all medieval and Renaissance philosophers.
Another proof of Angelo's not possessing the conscience
of a villain, but one that accuses him to his own great
shame and confusion, and proves that he is one of those
wicked men who are sinful because of weakness, and not
61.
62.
63.

Ibid: II, 2, 176-183.
Ibid: II, 4, 159-161.
Ibid: V, 1, 97-99.

from choice, is his evident sorrow when he accuses himself to the Duke:

o my dread lord,
I should be guiltier than my guiltiness~
To think I can be undiscernible,
When I perceive your Grace, like power divine
Hath look'd upon my passes. Then, good prince,
No longer session hold upon my shame,
But let my trial be mine O\vn confession. 64.
In contrast to the hypocrisy and self-conceit of Angelo,
which leads to his judgment being subjugated to his passions,--is Isabel, a
thing ensky'd and sainted. 65 .
as Lucio calls her.
Her moral judgment is absolutely in control of her
will, her sense of justice is so keen and her passions
so well under control, that she is immoveable in her dignity and beauty of character.

Her conscience is one which,

as Charron says,
does inspire men with wonderful strength
and assurance; and is a mighty stay, and defence, and support, in all manner of contingencies. 66.
Her reserve and modesty make her hesitate to appear before
Angelo as a suppliant for her brother's life.
Isabel

64.
65.
66.

Alas! What poor ability's in me
To do him good?

Ibid: V, 1, 370-376.
Ibid: I, 4, 34.
See Note 34.

Lucio Assay the power you have.
ISi.i"bel My power? Alas, I doubt, __ 67.
But as soon as Lucio convinces her that her duty is to
help her brother, she consents to appeal to Angelo.

She

is in full control of her body and its passions, and
Angelo's wicked solicitations have no effect upon her.
In the Juliet of Measure for Measure, we find a
conscience

v~ch

has been suddenly and completely over-

come by passion, and which repents as completely.
Prov:

Look, here comes one: a gentlewoman
of mine,
~fuo, falling in the flaws of her own
youth,
Hath b1ister'd her report. 68.

We have here, also, an example of the effect of passion
upon youth.

As 1Nright says,

The concupiscible passions are those
which are prone to gain control of youth,
while the irascible passions belong more
properly to age. 69.
The Duke, disguised as a Friar, calls upon Juliet to repent of her sin:
Duke
Jul.
Duke

Jul.
67.
68.
69.

Repent you, fair one, of the sin you
carry?
I do; and bear the shame most patiently.
I'll teach you how you shall arraign
your conscience,
And try your penitence, if it be sound,
Or hollowly put on.
I'll gladly learn.

Measure for Measure, I, 4, 76-79.
Ibid: II, 3, 10-12.
See Note 17.

Duke
Jul.
Duke
Jul.
Duke
Jul.
Duke

Jul.
Duke

Love you the man that wrong'd you?
Yes, as I love the woman that wrongtd
him.
So then, it seems your most offenceful
act
Was mutually committed?
Mutually.
Then was your sin of heavier kind than his?
I do confess it, and repent it, father.
'Tis meet so, daughter: but lest you do
repent,
As that the sin hath brought you to this
shame,
Which sorrow is always toward ourselves,
not heaven,
Showing we would not spare heaven as we
love it,
But as we stand in fear,-I do repent me, as it is an evil,
And take the shame with joy.
There rest. 70.

Here we have a perfect picture of the Catholic doctrine
of sovereign contrition for sin--sorrow because we know
we have offended God, rather than for any personal or interested motive.

Shakespeare may not have been a Catholic,

but his ethical and religious teachings are nearly always
in perfect accord with Catholic teaching.
Here also, is en illustration of Shakespeare's attitude toward sins of weakness, in contrast with maliciously
premeditated or unnatural sins.

As J. Courtenay James says,

in an article on "Religion in Shakespeare ll ,
Sin is never belittled, much less condoned
by Shakespeare. It is noticeable that sns of
ingratitude, selfishness and worldliness are
70.

Measure for Measure, II, 3, 19-35.

particularly condemned. In Shakespeare's
ethics, deeds which are the product of strong
impulse are more pardonable than premeditated
actions of fraudulence and hypocritical professions of generosity. Our Lord knew what was in
man, and He judged by the inwardness of moralib1_
Shakespeare also knew what was in man, and he
judged as did Our Lord. 71.
Among Shakespeare's villains, those who did evil from
free choice, and who were so steeped in sin that their consciences were almost

~une

to remorse, one remarkable ex-

ample is the Queen in King Henry VI.

It is very seldom

that Shakespeare's women have not some redeeming qualities,
but Margaret is an embodiment of all the crimes and vices
of the age in which she lives.

She ridicules her king's

piety and peaceable nature and becomes herself worse and
worse.

She is shamless in her sinful life, and it is im-

possible to discover evidence that she feels any torments
of conscience.

As an example of the villain who sins for

the sake of evil, Margaret is almost an equal of Richard III.
In the same play there is a striking passage illustrating the terrors of a conscience hardened in sin to such a
degree that the sinner dies impenitent.

Cardinal Beaufort

is dying, and the fiend approaches to carry his soul to hell:
Ah, what a sign it is of evil life,
Where death's approach is seen so terrible.
71.

J. Courtenay James, "Religion in Shakespeare", in
London Quarterly Review, Vol. 155, April 31, pp. 239-49.

-Warvlick

Beaufort, it is thy sovereign speaks
to thee.
Cardinal Bring me unto my trial when you will.
Died he not in his bed? where Should
he die?
Can I make men live, whether they will
or no?
0, torture me no more! I will confess.
Alive again? then show me where he is:
I'll give a thousand pounds to lool\:
upon him.
He hath no eyes, the dust hath blinded
them.
Comb down his hair; look, look! it
stands upright,
Like lime twigs set to catch my winged
soul.
o thou eternal mover of the heavens,
Look w.ith a gentle eye upon this wretch!
o beat away the busy, meddling fiend
That lays strong siege unto this wretch's
soul,
And from his bosom purge this black despair. 72.

Warwick
King

So bad a death argues a monstrous life.
Forbear to judge, for we are sinners all. 73 •

In the same play occurs a passage which illustrates well
the peace and strength that a good conscience imparts:
King

Vihat stronger breastplate than a heart
untainted!
Thrice is he arm'd that hath his quarrel
just,
And he but naked, though lock'd up in
steel,
vVhose conscience with injustice is corrupted. 74.

Cardinal Wolsey, in Henry VIII, is one of those
wicked men whom we find in Shakespeare, and in life, who

72.

73.
74.

J-I

Henry 11, III, 3, 5-23.
Ibid: 30-31.
Ibid: III, 2, 232-235.

have lived in absolute disregard of the demands of conscience until the loss of preferment or some other misfortune causes them to give thought to the vanity of
earthly pride and ambition.

Wolsey is an arrogant, schem-

ing churchman, pitiless and double-dealing; but when misfortune comes upon him, he sees his guilt and turns to
God.

Before he knows that the king has found him out, he

flatters him, and makes false pledges of loyalty and service.
Wolsey

Though all the world should crack their
duty to you,
And throw it from their soul; though
perils did
Abound, as thick as thought could make
'em, and
Appear in forms more horrid--yet my duty,
As doth a rock against the chiding flood,
Should the approach of this wild river
break,
And stand unshaken yours. 75.

The king gives him the packet of papers which has fallen
into the royal possession, and Wolsey knows that he is
undone.

The realization of the futility of human ambition

comes upon him, and he is convinced that he has been most
foolish to
hang on princes' favors. 76.
and he thanks the king for taking from his shoulders a
load would sink a navy, too much honor. 77.
75.
76.
77.

Henry VIII, III, 2, 193-198.
Henry VIII, III, 2, 367.
Ibid: III, 2, 383.

\Vhen he is disgraced he busies himself for the little
remaining time of his life in making his peace with God.
1,'Jhen Cromwell asks him how he dues he replies:
Why, well;
Never so truly happy, my good Cromwell.
I know myself now; and I feel within me
A peace above all earthly dignities,
A still and quiet conscience. 78.
The self-accusing conscience, which judges correctly,
without any influence from passion, but is in fear of
God's judgments, is expressed in the familiar words:
Wolsey

0 Cromwell, Cromwell!
Had I but served my God with half
the zeal
I served my king, he would not in
mine age
Have left me naked to mine enemies. 79.

Shakespeare in the same play gives us an illustration
of the peace of a good conscience in Buckingham, who is
executed for treason because of the hatred of Wolsey.

At

his trial, for an instant, as one of the Gentlemen says:
First Gent.

---he was stirred
With such an agony, he
extremely,
And something spoke in
ill and hasty.
But he fell to himself
and sweetly
In all the rest show'd
noble patience. 80.

sweat
choler,
again,
a most

Buckingham is moved to choler, and his physical
78.
79.
80.

Ibid:
Ibid:

Henry

376-379.
454-457.
VIII, II, 1, 32-36.

constitution bears witness to it, but as soon as he recovers from this almost involuntary feeling of anger, he
exhibits the resignation and quiet courage which are the
marks of a conscience at peace with God.
Buckingham

The law I bear no malice for my
death;
'T has done upon the premises but
justice;
But those that sought it I could
wish more Christians;
Be what they will, I heartily forgive 'em. 81.

And again, his resignation is beautifully expressed in the
following words:
Buckingham

Pray for me! I must now forsake ye;
the last hour
Of my long weary life is come upon me.
Farewell:
And when you would say something that
is sad,
Speak how I fell. I have done; and
God forgive me. 82.

This attitude toward death--accepting it with resignation, or as in the case of Cardinal Beaufort, meeting
it in terrible despair, but in no case with a joyful
looking forward to a life beyond the grave--is characteristic of all Shakespeare's characters.

In this instance

as in many others, Shakespeare is distinctly human and
natural; there is very little of supernatural motive in
delineations of character.
81.
92.

Ibid: 62-64.
Ibid: 131-136.

As Taylor

says~

When he crosses the plain of death, it
is but to portray the effect of the imminence
or contemplation of death upon the human mind
engaged with mortal aims or perceiving their
nUllity. 83.
In another place, he says:
It was a time when the energies, passions,
ambitions, of eager men threatened to submerge
the mystic anticipation of a life to come. No
joyful anticipation of the bliss of heaven is
expressed in Shakespeare. In plays as well as
sonnets, he has no love of death, but detests
it, along with all the 'wastes of t~e' and
time's thievish progress to eternity. Dismally
death's injurious approaches sap the beauty and
wit of woman, and man's strength and glory.
Reconcilement to the fatal necessity and a seemly
end, are the most that can be expected. 84.
This idea that a IIseemly end ll is what is to be desired
may be at the bottom of Wolsey's repentance and Buckingham's forgiveness of his enemies, but if one is to accept
the evidence of many other characters in Shakespeare, it
is more probable that he intended to portray the effect
of conscience upon a man as he is brought face to face with
death; or to illustrate the end of the "just man and the
sinner."
A villain who seems in the early part of the play to
be without conscience, but who repents most deeply later,
is Iachimo in Cymbeline.

He is a type of villain that

seems to be so naturally, as an effect of the climate in
which he was reared.
83.
84.

The Southern nature in Shakespeare's

Taylor, op.cit. Vol. II, pp. 257-258.
Ibid: pp. 257-258.

r
characters is represented as -ardent and violent.

Their

passions are easily aroused.
Iachimo is evil-minded, naturally wicked, and he
tempts Posthumous to lay the wager upon his wife's fidelity, with a fiendish trickery and delight that argues his
entire lack of moral integrity.

He carries out this plan

in the same spirit, and returns to gloat over his victory
to Posthumous.

He swears by all that he should hold sacred

that he is telling the truth, and one finds it difficult
to believe that he will ever repent.

By a change of for•
tune Iachimo is brought a prisoner to the court of Cymbeline, and he confesses most humbly the crime of which
he was guilty.

His conscience, which one might suppose

was entirely silenced in him, torments him so much with
the concealed crime, that he is glad "to be constrained
to utter that which torments him to conceal."

As he tells

the story of his villainy, he gives an explanation of his
actions in Britain, which agrees closely with the teachings of Elizabethan psychology with regard to the close
relationship of climate to conduct.
Away to Britain
Post I in this design; well may you, sir,
Remember me at court, where I was taught
Of your chaste daughter the wide difference
'Twixt amorous and villainous. Being thus
quench'd
Of hope, not longing, mine Italian brain
'Gan in your duller Britain operate

l",-------------------------:

r---------:------------.
Most vilely. 85.
Iachimo's sudden and complete conversion is in line
with Elizabethan belief that external influences have a
remarkable effect upon conduct.
Posthumous' conduct is nearly as reprehensible to a
modern mind as that of Iachimo.

It seems impossible that

a man of any depth of character could so easily fall a
victim to the wiles of a villain such as Iachimo, and believe him in such a matter.

It is probable that his cred-

iting of the circumstantial evidence which Iachimo presents,
is the direct result of his being so confident before, of
his wife's fidelity.

His confidence is shaken and changed

immediately into distrust.

His remorse and repentance at

the end of the play are as great as his rage when he saw
Iachimo with the tell-tale bracelet.

Posthumous was so

greatly moved by rage that he ordered his servant to put
to death the wife whom he dearly loved; but when his passions are cooled, and his judgment is ruled by calm reason
he repents bitterly of his deed.

He represents his con-

science as being imprisoned by guilt, as he is imprisoned
in his physical person, and he desires to be freed from
the imprisonment of a guilty conscience, even by death if
that is necessary.
Post.
85.

Most welcome, bondage!

Cymbeline, V, 5, 191-198.

for thou art

a way,
I think, to liberty: yet am I better
Than one that's sick 0' the gout; since he had
rather
Groan so in perpetuity than be cured
By the sure physician, death, who is the key
To unbar these locks. My conscience, thou art
fetter'd
More than my shanks and wrists: you good gods,
give me
The penitent instrument to pick that bolt.
Then, free forever! Is't enough I am sorry?
So children temporal fathers do appease;
Gods are more full of mercy. Must I repent?
I cannot do it better than in gyves. 86.
After Posthumous is freed from prison, and Iachimo has
confessed his crime, Posthumous is more enraged against
himself than against Iachimo.

His words express the

greatest sorrow and repentance:
Ay me! most credulous fool,
Egregious murderer, thief, anything
That's due to all the villains past; in being,
To come! 0 give me cord, or knife, or poison,
Some upright justicer! Thou, king, send out
For tortures ingenious: it is I
That all the abhorred things 0' the earth amend
By being worse than they. I am Posthumous,
That kill'd thy daughter: villain-like, I he;
That caused a lesser villain than myself,
A sacrilegious thief~ to do it. The temple
Of virtue was she. 8"t.
Posthumous proves most conclusively La Primaudaye1s
argument with regard to those whose heart and will deceive
them in the choice and election of that which is good, by
following reason and judgment corrupted, and thus they
86.
87.

Ibid: V, 4, 4-14.
Ibid: V, 5, 210-220.

are led to embrace their error. 88 •

He is also an example

of a tragic hero, who, as Miss Campbell says, sins under
the influence of passion, his reason failing to check his
passion.
Among the comedies we find numerous illustrations of
Shal{espeare's theories with regard to conscience--if we may
say that he had any definite theories in this regard.

At

any rate, there are many examples of the Elizabethan conception of the conscience, and of the effects upon the
individual of the self-accusing conscience or of the conscience that is at ease.

The play just discussed comes

under the classification of comedy, though it is one of a
"happy ending."

In the Winter's Tale, a comedy of the
'.

same period, and in much the same vein, we have another
remarkable example of sin and repentance.

Leontes does

not need a villain from a strange country to convince him
of his wife's infidelity, but his own mad jealousy makes
him take as proofs of guilty affection the courtesies and
kindnesses which his queen bestows upon his friend, a guest
at the court.

Leontes' repudiation of Hermione, and his

public accusation of her are almost beyond the bounds of
possibility.

The sudden conversion of the king, when the

death of his son causes him to acknowledge that he has
blasphemed the god Apollo, by not believing the oracle,
88.

See Note 36.

is also at first sight most unnatural.

But this is char-

acteristic of the psychology of the times, which pictures
the conscience as being swayed very suddenly by an emotion
which might become predominant on the instant.
Leontes

Apollo's angry; and the heavens
themselves
Do strike at my injustice.8g.

Leontes

Apollo, pardon
My great profaneness 'gainst thine
oracle!
I'll reconcile me to Polixenes
New woo my queen, recall the good
Camillo,
Whom I proclaim a man of truth, of
mercy. 90.

In speaking of his wronged friend, he says, expressing his
great remorse:
How he glisters
Through my rus t ! and how his piety
Does my deeds make the blackerJ 91.
\~en

he thinks his queen is dead he expresses still greater

grief and remorse:
Prithee bring me
To the dead bodies of my queen and son:
One grave shall be for both: upon them
shall
The causes of their death appear, unto
Our shame perpetual. 92.
Hermione's steadfastness under her afflictions and
89.
90.
91.
92.

-

Winter's Tale, III, 3, 145-146.
Ibid: III, 2, 155-159.
Ibid: III, 2, 171-173.
Ibid: III, 2, 236-240.

ber fearless defence of her character, are proofs of her
quiet and easy conscience.

In her dignified and calm

defence before the king, she declares her innocence, and
calls her lord himself to witness to the purity of her
life and her conscience:
Hermione

Since what I am to say must be but
that
\~ich contradicts my accusation and
The testimony on my part no other
But what comes from myself, it shall
scarce boot me
To say 'not guilty'; mine integrity
Being counted falsehood, shall, as I
express it
Be so received. But thus: if powers
divine
Behold our human actions, as they do,
I doubt not then but innocence shall
make
False accusation blush and tyranny
Tremble at patience. You, my lord,
best know,
~Y.ho least will seem to do so, my
past life
Hath been as continent, as chaste,
as true,
As I am now unhappy. 93.

In the old Lord Camillo, Shakespeare gives us a
splendid example of that perfect courtier whom Castiglione
characterizes in his Book of the Courtier, as,
an honest, a faire, condicioned man, and
of an upright conscience. 94.
His honesty is so apparent, even to the stranger king
Polixenes, that the latter does not hesitate to appeal to
93.
94.

Winter's T~le, III, 2, 23-36.
Hoby, Thomas, The Book of ~ Courtier, from the
Italian of Count Baldassare Castiglione, 1561, London,
900

,
;

him for enlightenment and help in the perplexity into
which Leontes' treatment has thrown him.
In the pastoral comedy As You Like It, Shakespeare
gives us another remarkable illustration of sudden conversion in Oliver, whose hatred of his young brother would
almost lead him to murder him, but who is so influenced
by the exterior circumstances of quiet and solitude that
his passion is subdued, and he confesses his sin openly:
Oliver

I do not shame
To tell you what I was, since my
conversion
So sweetly tastes, being the thing
I am. 95.

The finest picture of a contented conscience that can be
found in Shakespeare is in Duke Senior of As You Like It.
Duke S.

Now my co-mates and brothers in
exile,
Hath not old custom made this life
more sweet
Than that of painted pomp? Are not
these woods
. More free from peril than the envious
court? 96.

The content and peace which are found in simple surroundings, when accompanied by a good conscience, are expressed
in the familiar words:
Sweet are the uses of adversity,
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head;
And this our life, exempt from public haunt,
95.
96.

As You Like It, IV, 3, 135-138.
Ibid: II, 3,1-4.

Finds tongues in trees, books in the running
brooks,
Sermons in stones and good in everything. 97.
The effect of exterior circumstances upon the moral judgment is found in the Duke Frederick, who, while he is not
pictl~ed

as utterly debased and cruel, has committed the

crime of usurping the place of his brother, and banishing
his niece.

lNhen he finds himself among the quiet shades

and pleasant scenes of the Forest of Arden, away from the
intrigues and conventionalities of the court, his conscience
is touched with sorrow for his crime.
Jaq. de B.

And to the skirts of this wild
wood he came;
Where meeting with an old religious man,
After some question with him, was
converted
Both from his enterprise and from
the world. 98.

One of the strongest arguments to prove the power of
passion to overthrow reason and upset the power of moral
judgment is found in Antony and Cleopatra.

The oriental

magnificence, the glow and color, the irresistable charm
of the "serpent of old Nile" are fascinating.

But despite

the beauty of imagery which pervades the play and the
charm of the characters, one can feel throughout that in
this as in all the plays the moral laws that govern hmnan
life and destiny are still paramount.
97.
98.

Ibid: I, 3, 12-16.
Ibid: V, 4, 165-168.

As Dowden says,

The worship of Cleopatra for Antony, and
his for her, are destined to failure from the
beginning. There could be no true confidence,
no steadfast strength of love between them,
because their love was built wholly upon external fascination, and had no mutual confidence
in it. 99.
Antony is entirely under the sway of his passions, so much
so that his reason is unhinged.

Vihen he is away from Cleo-

patra, she for that time loses her power over him, and his
moral judgment causes him to repent, and spurn her as his
destroyer; but as soon as he finds himself again in her
presence, her fascination for him again asserts itself,
and his reason is again deposed in favor of his passion.
Antony expresses in himself all the Elizabethan belief in
the power of passion.
The great Roman play which illustrates the Greek and
Roman idea of conscience--the judgment of conduct based
upon the relationship of man to the good of the state--is
Coriolanus.
duty to Rome.

Coriolanus based his moral judgments upon his
Moulton elucidates this in his chapter on

tlRoman Life Dramatised," in Moral System of Shake speare.
He says that Coriolanus is one of three Roman plays which
illustrate the principle of the greatness and supremacy
of the state, as opposed to the people.

A compromise be-

tween the state--Coriolanus and the people--the tribune
99.

Dowden E., Shakespeare, American Book Co., 1878,
p. 140.

~
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and the plebeians--was attempted by Volumnia, who illustrates the spirit of compromise.

It was not his over-

mastering pride, but his devotion to the state as a principIe, that brought about the greatness of Coriolanus' character, even though Volumnia herself named it pride.

It

was his acting against this principle that compassed his
ruin.
Coriolanus was ruled by the passion of pride, but
more by his devotion to the state.

The good of the state

was to him the end of his moral actions, as God is the end
of the morality of a Christian.

When his aristocratic

pride is outraged at the hands of the plebians he turns
against the state, the object of his devotion, and joins
the enemies of Rome.

Coriolanus, by putting his private

wrongs and vengeance before the good of Rome, sacrificed
his moral principles, which were centered in patriotism.
He is induced by his mother to renounce his private revenge, and give himself up to death for the cause of his
country.

Thus Coriolanus becomes, according ·to Roman

ethics, a perfect member of the state.
The same theory is exemplified in Julius Caesar, in
the person of Brutus.

From the viewpoint of modern ethics,

Brutus commits a grevious sin of ingratitude and treachery
when he turns against his friend, to whom he owes a great
d.ebt of gratitude for the preferment he has given him;

r

but, according to the Roman standard of conduct, we must
acknowledge that Brutus, in so far as he was sincere, was
justified in the killing of Caesar.

His words, "Not that

I loved Caesar less, but that I loved Rome more," would
be the expression of his creed, lithe State before all
elself--and if his conscience judged this to be the highest
good, he would certainly be justified in carrying out
whatever he thought would conduce to that end.
Another play based upon life in pre-Christian times,
and one which embodies the morality of the Greeks, is
Troilus and Cressida.

Shakespeare uses this old story for

his own purposes and in his own way.

He does not make

Troilus ridiculous, and he pictures Cressida as utterly
shameless and unattractive.

It is a study in passion.

The illicit love of Troilus and Cressida is not in Shakespeare, any more than in Chaucer, the central crime of
the story.

The infidelity of Cressida is held up to

scorn to a far greater extent than is the other crime.
The doctrine of the will being led captive by the exterior
senses, is clearly expressed in "Troilus' words, when he
admits having fallen a victim to Cressida's charms:
Troilus

I take today a wife, and my election
Is led on in the conduct of my will;
Two traded pilots 'twixt the dangerous
shores
Of will
and judgment. 100.
~

__________

100.
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Troilus and Cressida, II, 2, 61-65.

Cressida acknowledges her infidelity and weakness in the
words:
Cressida

Ah, poor our sex! this fault in us
I find,
The error of our eye directs our mind:
~~at error leads must err: 0 then
conclude
Minds sway'd by eyes are full of
turpitude. 101.

The four plays vmich are almost universally considered
the greatest of the great plays of Shakespeare,--Othello,
King Lear, Macbeth,· and Hamlet,--afford in the consideration
of conscience, as in nearly every other question, the widest field of study.

In these four plays one finds the

most profound problems of morals and the greatest psychological study probably to be found in any work of artistic
literature.

These plays alone afford a complete summary

of Shakespeare's treatment of moral responsibility.

One

finds here examples of all the teachings of Renaissance
psychology wi th reference to conscience.
Othello presents nearly as many unsolved problems as
does Hamlet.

The motives of rago1s villainy, the sudden

degeneration of Othello, the extent of Emilia's responsibility--all these present endless unanswerable questions.
Iago has been presented in so many different ways by
critics that it is difficult to make any decision of one's
101.

Ibid: V, 2, 108-110.

r
own in regard to him.

By the elder critics, and by most

of the present day critics also, he is considered one of
those villains, like Richard III, who are artists in evil,
choosing evil deliberately, usually to compensate for the
lack of some pleasure or preferment or physical perfection of which they are painfully conscious.

Brandes, in

William Shakespeare, says:
He is mischievousness personified. He
does evil for the pleasure of hurting, and takes
active delight in the adversity and anguish of
others. He is that eternal envy which merit or
success in others never fails to irritate. He
is blear-eyed rancor itself, figuring as a great
power, nay--as the motive force in human life.
He embodies the detestation of others' excellences which shows itself in obstinate disbelief,
suspicion, or contempt; the instinct of hatred
for all that is open, beautiful, bright, good
and great.
Elsewhere, in reading Shakespeare's monologues, we learn what the person really is;
even a villain like Richard III is quite honest
in his monologues. Not so Iago. This demidevil is always trying to give himself reason
for his malignity, is always half fooling himself by dwelling on half-motives, in which he
partly believes, but disbelieves, in the main.
Coleridge aptly designated this action of his
mind: 'The motive-hunting of a motiveless maligni ty.' 102.
This characterization of Iago is the usually accepted
one.

Shucking, in his "Motives for Action in Shakespeare's

Playslt, quotes some of the nineteenth century German
102.

Brandes, George, William ShakesWeare, A Critical
Study, in Two Volumes, London, Villiam Hennemann,
1898, pp. 109-110.

critics, among them Kreyssig, Ulrici, and Gervinus, as
expounding this doctrine with regard to Iago.

Kreyssig

says that Iago tries to hide his own malignity from himself, as may be clearly recognized from his accusing his
wife of infidelity, though he himself is more than half
doubtful of this possibility.

Gervinus and Ulrici agree

in finding in Iago an unconscious tendency to persuade
himself of valid reasons for his conduct, and thus to
suppress any vague stirrings of conscience. 103.

This

last criticism implies a little deviation from the usually
accepted early opinion--that Iago is a villain merely by
choice.

If he were, he would not find it necessary to

seek reason for his wickedness--the very fact of his having
deliberately chosen evil would imply that he had effectually stifled the voice of his conscience, at least so long
as it was under the control of his will.
Stopford Brooke states the difference between the
earlier interpretations of lago and those generally accepted at the present time, in the following terse paragraph:
lago is raised by some writers into the representation of almost absolute evil: a Satan incarnate, with a majesty of evil surrounding him,
of which I think Shakespeare had no notion at
all. He is again represented as a great artist
103.

«
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L. L. Shucking, IIMotives for Action in Shakespeare's
Playsll, in Character Problems in Shakespeare's Plays,
Henry Holt, N. Y., 1922, p. 325.

of evil, who is enthralled with the pleasure
of his own artistry i:l;1 wiclcedness. I think
these views are grossly exaggerated, and that
Shakespeare would not accept them. There is
no majesty in Iago. He is a low cunning beast.
Nor is his intellect of a high character; it
is- keen and subtle, partly of the fox, but there
is nothing great about it. It enables him to
disguise his real nature, to wear th~ mask of
an honest man, of the bluff, open-speaking soldier; but that kind of cleverness is not uncommon, and needs no special intelligence. His
chief characteristics are self-love, sensuality,
and cruelty. 104.
Iago is a strange contradiction.

At times he seems to

declare his utter lack of conscientious scruples

open~y,

as when he says to Roderigo:
Were I the Moor, I would not be Iago:
In following him, I follow but myself;
Heaven is my judge, not I for love and
duty;
But seeming so, for my peculiar end. 105.
Again he appears to be making excuses, even to himself,
for his crimes, and trying to find means of quieting the
qualms of conscience, as when he says:
Iago

Though in the trade of war I have slain
men,
Yet do I hold it very stuff Of the conscience
To do contrivfd murder. I lack iniquity
Sometimes to do me service. 106.

Craig, in his notes on Othello, says t~t Coleridge
104.
105.
106.

Stopford Brooke, Ten More Plays of Shakespeare,
p. 184, wndon, Constable, 1913.
Othello, I, 1, 57-60.
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based his famous line, "the motive-hunting of a motiveless
maligni tylf, upon the passage in which I.ago seems deliberately to search for sufficient reason for carrying out
his diabolical plan.
I, for mere suspicion in that kind,
Will do as if for surety. He holds me well;
The better shall my purpose work on him. 107.
The Moor is 0 f a free and open nature,
That thinks men honest that but seem to be so,
And will as tenderly be led by the nose
As asses are.
I have't. It is engender 'd. Hell and night
Must bring this monstrous birth to the world's
light. 108.
In the final lines of this speech another clue is
given to the hardness of lago's conSCience, and his persistence in evil.

He chooses hell instead of heaven, and

proclaims his allegiance to the devil.

These final words

may imply that he belongs to that third class of villains
who choose evil merely for the sake of evil, without any
reason.

Craig says, however, that lago has personal mo-

tives, which he expresses more than once.
His military record was good, and he deserved, so
he thought, the position that had been given to Cassio.
Also, although he does not believe the rumor concerning
Othello and Emilia, he is determined to avenge the bare
suspicion, inasmuch as it injures his reputation.
107.
108.

-

Othello, I, 3, 395-397.
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lago's

pride and jealousy are the motives that govern him and
silence all conscientious scruples.
Iago thinks evil of everyone.
is good.

In his eyes no one

He has no scruples about imputing a grave crime

to the spotless Desdemona.

He thinks that all women are

wantons, and does not hesitate to impute wickedness to
his own wife.
Iago

He says of women:

I know our country disposition well;
In Venice they do let heaven see the
pranks
They dare not ahow their husbands;
their best conscience
Is not to leave't undone, but keep't
unknown. 109.

The character of Othello is one of the finest illustrations in Shakespeare of the effect of the passions upon
the judgment, and also of the sudden and almost inexplicable change in character and action brought about by
exterior causes.

Othello, in the beginning, manifests

himself a man of caIn1 disposition, of unblemished honor,
and of a quiet and untroubled conscience:
Othello

My parts, my title, and my perfect
soul
Shall manifest me rightly. 110.

Even his enemy speaks of Othello in terms of praise:
The Moor is of a free and open nature
That thinks men honest that but seem
to be so. 111.
109.
110.
111.
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Also:
The Moor, howbeit that I endure him not
Is of a constant, loving, noble nature. i12 .
Othello is, as Iago says, of a free and noble nature;
when Lodovico sees his treatment of Desdemona, he says:
Is this tre nature
vVhom passion could not shake? whose solid
virtue
The shot of accident, nor dart of chance,
Could neither graze nor pierce? 113.
This opinion of Othello's greatness of spirit is carefully built up from the opening of the play; and the
contrast when he gives way completely to the passion of
jealousy, is difficult to explain.
A hint is given of the transformation to take place
in Othello's behavior, in Act II, when Cassio and JiIontano
have quarreled.
othello

My blood begins my safer guides to
rule;
And passion, having my best judgment
collied,
Assays to lead the way. 114.

Some critics say that Shakespeare intended that we
should believe that Othello had
poured his treasure into foreign
laps, 115.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Ibid: II, 296-297.
Ibid: IV, 1, 274-277.
Ibid: II, 3, 205-208.
Furness, Variormn, Othello, p. 422--quoted by
Stoll, Othello, p. 2.

and that it was a guilty conscience that made him ,so
easily convinced of Desdemona's guilt.

Another argument

is that his very trustfulness and love for his wife made
him an easy prey to jealousy.

Stoll's whole argument is

against the study of Othello psychologically.

He says

that Shakespeare did not pretend to make a character psychologically consistent.

He wrote for the stage, and used

the dramatic conventions Which he knew would be intelligible to his audience, without regard to their psychological significance.

He says that the instilling of jeal-

ousy into a man's soul by a villain's wiles is an arbitrary but immemorial convention, and one that an Elizabethan
audience could fully appreciate.

Stoll says,

With or without sexual jealousy, the convention of the calmnniator credited is one of the
oldest traditions of the drama. The matter is
everything, the manner nothing. 116.
He says again,
The dramatist leans on the dramatic convention of slander and 'diabolical soliciting'
(which means here almost diabolical possession,
not merely temptation). Othello is untainted,
and yet is overwhelmed at his only vulnerable
point, his trustfulness, by superhuman art. 117.
However, the passion of jealousy may be interpreted
as having entered into, and enslaved the mind and spirit
116.
117.

Stoll, E. E., Othello, A Historical and Comparative
Study, University of Minnesota, 1915, p. 6.
Ibid: p. 17.

of Othello; when Iago has begun to work upon him, the
images that he calls forth of Desdemona's wickedness and
his ovm disgrace keep his passions so stirred up that his
calm reasonable judgment is completely overthrown.

His

conscience is still extremely active, and shows itself in
the end when he proves himself fully aware of the nature
of his deed.

Othello's moral judgments are suspended,

but his conscience is active and trustworthy, and in the
end asserts its supremacy. 118.
Emilia is a character in which the conscience seems
peculiarly absent.

She has no qualms about stealing the

handkerchief for her husband, and when she might have
saved her mistress a great deal of suffering, she does
not tell what she knows.

She is truly devoted to Desdemona,

however, and finally dies defending her.

That Emilia's

conscience is not likely to trouble her a great deal about
the means she might use to attain a desired end, and that
Desdemona's is so true and pure that she cannot endure the
slightest suspicion to come near her, is sho\Vll in the conversation between the two, after Othello has accused Desdemona of inconstancy.
Des.

118.

-

Dost thou in conscience think, tell me,
Ernilia,-That there be women do abuse their husbands
In such gross kind?

See Craig, op.cit., p. 716.

Emil.
Des.
:&nil.

DeS:""

Emil.
Des.
:&nil.

There be some such, no question.
Wouldst thou do such a deed for all
the world?
Vfuy, would not you?
No, by this heavenly light!
Nor I, by this heavenly light; I
might do't as well in the dark.
Woulds't thou do such a deed for all
the world?
The world's e. huge thing: it is a
great price
For a small vice. 119.

To Desdemona's purity of conscience the entire play
bears witness.
Brabantio

Her father says of her that she was,
A maiden never bold
Of spirit so still and quiet that
her motion
Blush'd at itself. 120.

He thinks that his daughter's judgment has been
paralyzed by drugs or witchcraft, and thus her duty to
him and her sense of fitness have been destroyed.
Brabantio

119.
120.
121.

It is a judgment maim'd and most
imperfect
That will confess perfection so
could err
Against all rules of nature, and
must be driven
To find out practises of cunning
hell,
'\Nhy this should be. I therefore
vouch again
That with some mixtures powerful
o'er the blood,
Or with some dram conjur'd to this
effect,
He wrought upon her. 121.

Othello, IV, 3, 61-69.
Ibid: I, 3, 95-97.
Ibid: I, 3, 99-106.
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This Elizabethan doctrine of the power of supernatural
forces in weakening moral responsibility is used over
and over again in Othello.

Of course in this particular

instance, Othello refutes Brabantio by telling of his
wooing of Desdemona by true and honorable means, and thus
the imputation against Desdemona's character is contradicted.
Iago speaks in praise of her goodness even when he
is plotting his diabolical schemes against her:
So will I turn her virtue into pitch
And out of her own goodness make the net
That shall enmesh them all. 122.
When the terrible plot has been worked out, and
Othello has openly accused Desdemona of infidelity, she
cannot bear even to repeat the name by Which he has called
her.
Des.
Iago
Des.

Am I that name, Iago?
name, fair lady?
Such as she says my lord did say I was. 123.

~nat

vVhen Othello prepares to kill her, and tells her to
reconcile herself with heaven and grace, since he would
not kill her soul, she says that she does not know why
she fears.
Des.

122.
123.
124.

-

Why I should fear I know not
Since guiltiness I know not, but yet
feel I fear. 124.

Ibid: II, 3, 366-369.
Ibid: IV, 2, 117-119.
Ibid: V, 2, 31-33.

othello does not believe her, but we know, as he
did not, how utterly guiltless she is.

This is a con-

science in whiCh the reason is sovereign, and keeps her
sovereignty even under the attack of the passion of grave
fear.
King Lear is essentially a tragedy of ingratitude,
but as Miss Campbell says, it is more than that.
a tragedy of anger against ingratitude.
is built around this theme.

It is

The entire play

The ingratitude of Lear's

elder daughters is the motivating action, but beyond that
we have the righteous indignation of Kent protesting
against his master's deed, Albany against his wife, and
Edmund, and Cordelia and the King of France fighting for
the restitution of Lear.
and details. 125.

The play is pagan in its setting

Wilson Knight makes the following state-

ment:
Lear is a symbolic pattern of human affairs
exactly correspondent to any philosophy which is
limited to a strict naturalism, pessimistic but
stoic. It is bleak, colorless, limited, naturalistic. Hence, it is pagan through and through.
In ~ our vision is constricted to the earth. 126.
Hardin Craig, in contradiction of Knight's argument, says
that, although the play is pagan, it is interpreted by
Christian philosophy.
125.
126.

He says that the four moral virtues

Campbell, op.cit., p. 200.
Knight, Wilson, "Macbeth and Antony and Cleopatra",
The Imperial Theme, Oxford U. Press, 1931.

are the theme upon which the play is based, the outstanding principal basis of the plot being the virtue of prudence.

These virtues were especially honored by the old

philosophers, and were defined and applied by st. Thomas.
In Aristotle the virtue of prudence is tne groundwork and
source of all other virtues.

Upon the observance or non-

observance of the virtue of prudence the entire moral
system of this play is built.

It also emphasizes the

enormity of crimes against nature. The foolish imprudence
of Lear is the great error which forms the motivating action of the play; and the base ingratitude of the elder
daughters and the wickedness of Edmund are the crimes
against nature which upset the established order.
King Lear's sin lay in his pride and in his stubborn
resistance to any suggestion from his courtiers that Cordelia was true.

It was his vanity· and pride that caused

him to repudiate Cordelia because she would not flatter
him.

His conscience was hardened against her, and later

on in the play, when misfortunes had come thick upon him,
and he began to repent, he acknowledged that he had been
unkind and selfish with regard to the poor in his kingdom.
Lear
..............

Poor naked wretches, wheresoe'er you are,
That bide the pelting of this pitiless
storm,
How shall your houseless heads and ·unfed
sides,
Your loopfd and window'd raggedness, defend
you

r __-----------------------------------------------------.
From seasons such as these? 0, I have ta'en
Too little care of this. 127.
Lear is religious.

His devotion to the gods and his

acknowledgment of their providence is evident throughout
the play.

When he realizes his crime against his youngest

daughter, he confesses his error in words that indicate
clearly the relationship that judgment and passion bear to
moral responsibility:
Lear

°

most small fault
How ugly dids't thou in Cordelia show!
That, like an engine, wrench'd my frame
of nature,
From the fix'd place; drew from my heart
all love,
And added to the gall.
Lear, Lear, Learl
Beat at this gate, that let thy folly in,
And thy dear judgment out. 128.

°

Just before he loses control of his passions and his judgment in madness, he acknowledges the power of the gods,
their control over the conscience of men, and their justice
in punishing the guilty, when he says:
Let the great gods
That keep this dreadful pother o'er our heads,
Find out their enemies now. Tremble, thou wretch,
That hast within thee undivulged crimes,
Unwhipp'd of justice: hide thee, thou bloody hand;
Thou perjur'd, and thou simular of virtue
That art incestuous: caitiff, to pieces shake,
That under covert and convenient seeming
Hast practis'd on man's life: close pent-up guilts,
Rive your concealing continents, and cry
These dreadful summoners grace.--I am a man
More sinn'd against than sinning. 129.
127.
128.
129.

King Lear, III, 4, 27-31.
Ibid: I, 4, 287-294.
IbId: III, 2, 49-59.

\Vhen Lear is completely mad, of course he has no
more responsibility for his actions, his conscience is
not under his control--that is, its action is suspended,
and he abandons his faith in the justice of the gods.
vYhy, thou wert better in thy grave, than
to answer
With thy uncovered body this extremity of the
skies.
Is man no more than this?-----Off, off, you
lendingsl 130.
When Cordelia has returned, and Lear struggles back
to partial sanity, he tries to make amends to his youngest
daughter, and accompanies her joyfully to prison:
Come, let's away to prison:
We two alone will sing like birds i' the cage;
When thou dost ask me blessinl$~ I'll kneel down
And ask of thee forgiveness. ~vl.
And when Cordelia dies, King Lear's grief and despair
drive him back into insanity.

Lear's conscience is ruled

by the passions of pride and vanity, and because of his
fatal lack of prudence, he allows his enemies to gain control of his kingdom and to overthrow his reason.
no calm moral judgment, although he is religious.
is not one of malice.

He has
His sin

It is indeed true that he was a man

"more sinn'd against than sinning."
The villains of the play illustrate two types of villain recognized by Elizabethan psychology.
130.
131.

Ibid: III, 4, 105-107, 115.
Ibid: V, 1, 7-10.

The sisters,

Regan and Goneril, are among the few women of Shakespeare
that are entirely wicked, almost more so than human nature
will allow.
choice.

They are villains who are so of their own

They have no redeeming qualities.

Nowhere is any

hesitancy in evil manifested, whether caused by qualms of
conscience or in any other way.

One might be led to sup-

pose in the earlier part of the play, that even in their
ingratitude and wickedness toward their father, that they
had a fondness for each other; but it is not long before
we discover that they hate each other as they do their
father and their young sister.

The crime of ingratitude

brings with it its own punishment for the wicked daughters
. of Lear.

It is a crime against nature, which is never al-

lowed to go unpunished, in Shakespeare or in life.
The other villain, Edmund, is one of these wicked men,
who, like Richard III, choose to ally themselves with the
powers of evil because they feel themselves outside the
pale of normal nature.

Edmund plans deliberately to bring

about the ruin of his brother Edgar, and states as the motive for his crime that he must equal in some way his legitimate brother, if not in birth.

He reasons that, as

long as he is not born under the pale of honor and custom,
he will enjoy the pleasures that nature can give.him.

This

is the deliberate setting aside of moral judgment and the
joining in a confederacy with sin.

Edm.

Thou, nature, art my goddess; to thy law
My services are bound.
Legitimate Edgar, I must have your land;
Well my legitimate, if this letter speed,
And my invention thrive, Edmund the base
Shall top the legitimate. I grow, I
prosper:
Now, gods, stand up for bastards! 132.

Edmund ridicules the

~elief

in planetary influence

which was one of the most popular beliefs of the time.
He states clearly that he is wicked, not because of this
star or that, but because he chooses to be so.
Edm.

This is the excellent foppery of the
world, that, when we are sick in fortune,
--often the surfeit of our own behaviour,
--we make guilty of our disasters the sun,
the moon, and the stars: as if we were
villains by necessity; fools by heavenly
compulsion; knaves, thieves, and treachers
by spherical predominance; drunkards, liars,
and adulterers, by an enforced obedience of
planetary influence; and all that we are
evil in, by a divine thrusting on. 133.

Edmund characterizes the goodness of Edgar, and the purity
and peace of his conscience, when he says of him:
A brother noble
Whose nature is so far from doing harms
That he suspects none: on whose foolish
honesty
My practises ride easy. 134.
Edmund continues his villainous and treacherous practices
until almost the end, when he fights with his own brother.
132.
133.
134.

Ibid: I, 2, 1-2, 16, 19-22.
Ibid: I, 2, 128-138.
Ibid: I, 2, 195-198.
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It is at this time that he shows his conscience not to
be entirely subuued to his evil passions.
a villain as are Regan and Goneril.

He is not such

Before he dies he

repents, and wishes to do an act of justice before it
is too late.

He is born outside the pale of the social

order; he makes himself deliberately an enemy to gods and
men, but at the end he proves that he has some humanity.
Edm.

I pant for life: some good I mean to do,
Despite of my own nature. Q,uicldy send:
Be brief in it, to the castle; for my
writ
Is on the life of Lear and Cordelia. 135.

Of the conscience of Cordelia, one may say that it
is one of those which is not swayed by passion.

Her spirit

is so gentle, and her nature so calm and even, that passion, even though it rises in her at her father's injustice and her sisters' cruelty, is never allowed to gain
the sovereignty over her judgment.

She displays her

love of virtue and modesty, and her admiration for truth,
in the words:
Cord.

135.

I yet beseech your majesty,-If for I want that glib and oily art
To speak and purpose not; since what
I well intend,
I'll do't before I speak,--that you
make known
It is no vicious blot, murder or foulness,
No unchaste action, or dishonor'd step
That hath depriv'd me of your grace and
favour;

Ibid: V, 3, 243-246.

r

~---------------------------------------------------.

But even for want of that for which I am richer,
A still-soliciting eye, and such a tongue
As I am glad I have not. 136.
vVhen Goneril in her duplicity presumes to counsel
Cordelia to be true to her husband as she has not been to
her father, and tells her that she is suffering justly for
her disobedience, Cordelia shows her confidence in her own
innocence and her knowledge of her sister's crimes:
Time shall unfold what plaited cunning
hides:
Who cover faults, at least shame them
derides. 137.
This is an expression of the doctrine that retribution will overtake the wicked.

This brings up the ques-

tion that has been frequently discussed as to whether the
theory of retribution which is so common in Elizabethan
psychology, and also in the literature of the period, was
not fulfilled in the case of Cordelia.

Her fate was not

dominated by Nemesis, but as Moulton says,
by another dramatic motive,--that of pathos,
--that unlocks the sympathy of the spectator,
and sheds a beauty over suffering itself. Cordelia
has devoted herself to her father; fate mysteriously seconds her devotion, and leaves out nothing,
not even her life, to make the sacrifice complete. 138.
The tragedy of Macbeth presents a wonderful study of
sin and its punishment.

It is a tragedy of religion, state,

royalty and patriotism, and above all, ambition.
136.
137.
138.

Ibid: I, 1, 227-234.
Ibid: I~ 1, 283-284.
Moulton, op.cit., p. 47.

E. K.

Chambers characterizes the playas a cosmic tragedy, and
says that as such it is philosophical rather than psychological. 139.

But the philosophical interest transcends

rather than excludes the psychological, since after all
it is through and not apart from human character that
external forces are conceived as acting upon and disposing
of human destinies.

The psychological interest of the

play lies in the study of the contrasted effects of sin,
and the results of sin upon two characters of different
mould and fibre, one that of a man--realizing itself in
action, the other that of a woman, realizing itself in
thought and will.

The noblest side of Macbeth's nature

is his bravery and devotion as a soldier,--away from the
battle field he is like common men.

Dowden expresses

the same idea with regard to Macbeth's good qualities:
The theme of the drama is the gradual
ruin, through yielding to evil within and
without, of a man, who though tainted from
the first by base and ambitious thoughts, yet
possesses elements in his nature of pO'ssible
honor and loyalty. 140.
That Macbeth was held in high esteem by his associates, and by the king himself, is shown in the very opening of the play, when after the battle, Macbeth and Banquo
are praised by the wounded sergeant for their bravery,'
139.
140.

Chambers, E. K., Shakespeare: A Survey, Sedgwick

& Jackson, London, 1925, p. 234.
Dowden, Shakespeare, p. 138.

and the king speaks highly of Macbeth in the words:
Duncan

0 valiant cousinl

worthy gentleman. 141.

Craig says,
The two great characters in Macbeth are
both cast in noble mould, both consistently
conceived and perfectly adjusted the one to
the other. Macbeth is man yielding to temptation and plunging deeper and deeper into sin.
Lady Macbeth is woman in the nature of her
ambitions (as far as one can see, largely for
her husband and for social position) in her
sense of the importance of tangible things
and of bearing and deportment, and in her
methods with her husband. Perhaps Macbeth as
conceived by Elizabethan audiences, would be
more irrunediately condemned as a villain than
he is by us. Ambition to them was fundamentally a sin, and the idea of surrendering
one's soul to the devil was more immediately
horrible. Macbeth seems to place every hope
upon the earthly life and to sacrifice every
noble ideal and every manly virtue to a wicked
ambition; but, in doing so, he does not rid
himself of the fear of human justice. The
element of earthly fear in his composition is
large. He seems to be preyed upon throughout
by dread of punishment, by horrible dreams,
startings and agonies, than moved by any spiritualized remorse or repentance. 142.
Stopford Brooke

carrie~

out somewhat the same idea,

when he says that killing in itself does not trouble
Macbeth at all, because he is a rude soldier of a rude
time, and killing is his trade.

The thing that does

trouble him is his violation of his code of honor. 143.
141.
142.
143.

Macbeth, I, 2, 24.
Craig, Shakespeare, p. 723.
Stopford Brooke, On Ten Plays of Shakespeare,
p. 196.

He says, arguing with Lady Macbeth and his own ambition,
against the proposed crime:
Macbeth

He's here in double trust;
First, as I am his kinsman and his
subject,
Strong both against the deed, then,
as his host,
\'Vb.o should against his murderer shut
the door,
Not bear the knife myself. 144.

Macbeth understands clearly the enormity of his sin:
Macbeth

His virtues
Will plead like angels! trumpet
tongu'd, against
The deep damnation of his taking-off;
And pity, like a naked new born babe,
Striding the blast; or heaven's cherubim, hors' d
Upon the sightless couriers of the air,
Shall blow the horrid deed in every
eye,
That tears shall dro,vn the wind. I
have no spur
To prick the sides of my intent, but
only
Vaulting ambition, which o'erleaps
itself
And falls on the other. 145.

Stopford Brooke says

~urther

that this sense of honor,

which is frequently man's only conscience, disappears
entirely after Macbeth has begun his succession of terrible crimes.

He has no real remorse, but the wild in-

different recklessness which comes to one who knows that
he has deliberately Shut himself off from his fellows by
144.
145.

Macbeth, I, 6, 12-16.
Ibid: I, 7, 18-27.

a fatal act of dishonor.
Macbeth is under the control of a nameless fear.

yield to that

really does not definitely will Duncan's murder.

He says:

Why do I
suggestion
\Vhose horrid image doth unfix my hair
And make my seated heart knock at my
ribs,
Against the use of nature? Present
fears
Are less than horrible imaginings:
My thought, whose murder yet is but
fantastical
Shakes so my single state of man that
function
Is smother'd in surmise, and nothing is
But vlhat is not. 146.
This horrible suggestion, or temptation, assails
Macbeth through his imagination.

Macbeth's will and

reason are under the control of his imagination.

In

conjunction with the exterior diabolical agency of the
wierd sisters, it keeps before him the crown which his
ambition urges as the highest good.

His imagination is

at the root of his crime, but it also is the cause of
his hesitations, his fears; and it is the cause of the
terrible agony vmich he undergoes at the appearance of
the ghost of Banquo.
Lady M.
Macbeth

146.

Are you a man?
Aye, and a bold one, that dare look
on that
Which might appal the divine.

Ibid: I, 134-141.

He

Lady M.

0 proper stuff!
is the very painting of your
fear.
This is the air-drawn dagger, which
you said
Led you to Duncan. 147.
~his

Macbeth has physical courage to a great degree, but
no moral courage.

It is this physical courage which is

the cause of the high esteem in which he is held by his
associates and. by the Icing :tn the early part of the play.
The courage that he displays later on in the play is
caused by his desperation.

He has begun to be independ-

ent of Lady Macbeth, and is becoming accustomed to crime,
and thus grows indifferent and bold.
Macbeth

Lady M.
!',1ac beth

I am in blood
Steppld in so far that, should I
wade no more,
Returning were as tedious as go o'er:
Strange things I have in head, that
will to hand;
\fuich must be acted ere they may be
scann'd.
You lack the season of all natures,
sleep.
Come, we III to sleep. My strange
and self-abuse
Is the initiate fear that wants hard
use:
We are yet but young in deed. 148.

In the end, Macbeth's bold words when faced by
Macduff display a courage which is caused by a new impulse of passion.

He will not live to be the "rabble's

curse."
147.
148.

Ibid: III, 4, 57-63.
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Macbeth

Before my body
I throw my warlike shield. Lay on,
Macduff,
And damn'd be he that first cries
Hold, enough. 149.

Mr. Albert B. Purdee has carefully worked out a study
of the sin and punishment of Macbeth, and says that it
parallels exactly the scholastic doctrine, as elucidated
by St. Thomas.
He says that as Shakespeare used Holinshed as his
historical source, so he almost seems to have referred to
St. Thomas Aquinas for his philosophy.

St. Thomas and

Shakespeare are statement and illustration of the same
truths.

Scholastic logical consistency is to be found in

Macbeth--it is a complete study in sin, and it corresponds
in a remarkable way to the treatment of the same subject
by St. Thomas.
Purdee divides the playas follows: He says that
temptation to sin comprises the first act and the first
,scene of the second act; that is, up to the commission of
the crime.

The sin itself is the subject of act two, and

the consequences of the sin are brought out in the last
two acts.
According to Purdee, following St! Thomas, man reaches
his supernatural end by the observance of acts, and into
these acts enters the twofold element of reason and free
will.
149.

The reason judges; the will determines upon
Ibid: V, 8, 32-34.

performance or omission.

A will inclined to evil is the

prime interior cause of sin; but there are two exterior
causes that may enter in,man and demonic agencies.

In

the first scene of Macbeth the preternatural agency soliciting to sin is introduced.

St. Thomas says that the

devil tempts by exploring the inner condition of a man,
that he may work on that vicious propensity to which a
man is prone.

(That is as much as to say

tr~t

a man's

appetites and passions are likely to unite themselves to
exterior causes of evil.)

Then the devil forces a change

in the appetites, and though he cannot actually force the
will, he may incline it.

This is just how the witches in

Macbeth join their prophecies to the passion of ambition
which is already rooted in his soul.
The second exterior cause--man, is found in Lady
Macbeth.

Her wild and reckless determination carries her

over all the dictates of reason and urges Macbeth away
from cool judgment.

Lady Macbeth stifles the cry of rea-

son, and makes outcast her very conscience, in which sure
sentence is passed on the morality of acts.
and dehumanises herself.
of her husband.

She unsexes

She is to precipitate the ruin

In Macbeth conscience makes one moral

appeal, even if on ignoble scores.

He saw the possibility

of eternal punishment and, what grieved him still more
deeply, the punishment that would dog him the rest of his

life (poena concomitans).

But he dismisses the warnings

of his judgment, and his will is in accord with the urging
to sin.
In the second part of the drama the sin itself takes
place, when Macbeth's will becomes insurgent against the
law of God, and he carries out in act what he has been
guilty of in desire.

His imagination pictures to him the

dagger that he is to use to kill his king and guest: this
is the last protest against sin.

He suffers in his con-

science but nevertheless carries out the deed.
The consequences of sin are many.
corrupted.

First, nature is

Man has three fold natural good: the intrinsic

principles by which he is a rational being, the natural
tendency to the perfonaance of virtuous acts, and the gratuitous gift of original justice.
tion of his nature.

Macbeth suffers corrup-

He has habituated himself to evil,

his reason is hesitant in action, his will is in arms
against good;--his passion for evil grows.

But beside

this sapping of his moral forces, he is in a state of
guilt.

It is not merely the stain on his hands that he

realizes, but that on his soul.
Will all great Neptune1s ocean wash this
blood
Clean from my hand? No, this my hand will
rather
The multitudinous seas incarnadine,
Making the green one red. 150.
150.

Macbeth, II, 2, 60-63.

An act of sin is rebellion against self, man, and
God, and incurs a triple punishment.

Macbeth's sin began

internally with the wilful disregard of the dictates of
right reason, and so his first punishment will come from
his own soul--his mind will torture him with anxiety and
uneaSiness, his conscience will be racked with remorse,
and despair will freeze his heart.

This is the concomi-

tant punishment spoken of by St. Thomas.

The anxiety and

insecurity caused by sin open the way to further sins.
This is the cause in Macbeth of his murder of the grooms
and of Banquo.

St. Thomas places as one of the punish-

ments of sin the increased liability to temptation from
the power of evil--it is not surprising that Macbeth
should return to the weird sisters.

Finally despair is

the severest punishment of self on self.

Macbeth is a

rebel against God, against himself, and against human
government.
The last phase of Macbeth's earthly punishment is
swift and terrible.

He is oppressed by his sins, but he

feels no contrition.

He speaks of himself as much as of

Lady Macbeth, when he asks the Doctor:
Canst thou not minister to a mind diseas'd;
Pluck from the memory a root'd sorrow;
Raze out the written troubles of the brain;
And with some sweet oblivious antidote
Cleanse the stuff'd bosom of that perilous
stuff

Which weighs upon the heart? 151.
For a man to repent, he who freely admitted the evil,
must freely' turn to good.
--he fights and dies.

Macbeth does not turn to good,

The eternal punishment alone re-

mains. 152.
Macbeth's crime, as Wilson Knight says,is a blow
against nature's unity and peace, a hideous desecration
of all creative and family and social duties, all union
and concord.

He murders hospitality and sleep, therefore

his punishment is a living death.

This is the reason

that he hears the voice cry
Sleep no more, Macbeth does murder
sleep. 153.
This is the reason that he is not allowed his place at
the banquet table.

And finally it is this that makes him

at the final catastrophe, cry to Macduff:
Get thee back 1 my soul is too much
charg'd
With blood of thine already. 154.
As to Lady Macbeth, she seems to have had mOl'e original goodness of character than Macbeth.

Her crime was

the direct result of a strong will influenced by fierce
passion. 155.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Miss Campbell says, that the principal
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cause of the dreadfulness of Lady Macbeth's despair lies
in her having been false to herself as a woman.

She is

pictured as consciously unsexing herself, as converting
all that is womanly into the courage and determination to
be' cruel.

Even more than Macbeth, she dyes her will in

ambition; her punishment is more terrible than that of
Macbeth, and brings her to the sin of

self-destructi~n.156.

Lady Macbeth was never really heartless, even in the
midst of the overwhelming impulse which drove her to murder; and after the natural good in her character had begun
to emerge, she became the victim of an avenging conscience.
Finally, in another rush of unregulated impulse, she laid
violent hands on herself.

As Brooke says:

Lady Macbeth walks with her
conscience at night, and dies before
the dawn. 157.
'Ene character of Banquo offers a striking contrast
to that of Macbeth in the matter of conscience.

Banquo

hears the prophecies of the weird sisters, but because
his conscience is sensitive, he dreads the appearance of
evil, and does not allow himself to be unduly influenced
by their promises.

He is pleased with the idea of his

descendants being kings, but he knows that from evil no
good can arise.
156.
157.

He warns Macbeth against the promises of

Campbell, op.cit. p. 238.
Stopford Brooke, Ten Plays

£f

Shakespeare, p. 204.

the witches. 158 .
Banquo knows the evil effect that imagination has
upon the conscience, and even in sleep he guards against
its taking too strong hold upon'him.

He prays before he

sleeps:
Banquo

Merciful powers
Restrain in me the curs'd thoughts that
nature
Gives way to in repose. 159.

Banquo with his keen, clear conscience, is set over against
Macbeth, whose only conscience is his sense of honor.

Ban-

quo also has a soldier's sense of honor, but it is strengthened by a good conscience, which distrusts even the suggestion of evil.
When Macbeth tempts him wi th promises of greatness
in the words:
If you shall cleave to my consent,
when 'tis,
It shall make honor for you, 160.
He answers:
So I 10 se none
In seeking to augment it, but still
keep
.
My bosom franchis'd and allegiance
clear,
I shall be counsell 'd. 161.
BanquoTs clear-sighted conscientiousness is a menace to
158.
159.
160.
161.
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Macbeth, and it is because the tyrant fears Banquo's
intelligence and his sensitive conscience, that Macbeth
puts him to death.
Macbeth

Our fears in Banquo
Stick deep; and in his royalty of
nature
Reigns that which would be feartd;
'tis much he dares,
And to that dauntless temper of his
mind,
He hath a wisdom that doth guide his
valor
To act in safety. 162.

Beyond a doubt the character of Hamlet has been
more discussed than any other in Shakespeare; and of all
the problems that this very complex character presents,
one that offers the most ground for discussion and disagreement is that of the extent of his moral responsibility, and the reasons that lie at the bottom of his
procrastination.
That Hamlet before the appearance of the ghost was
a man of pleasing appearance and address, admired by his
associates and by the people in general, is vouched for
by Ophelia in the speech beginning,
0, what a noble mind is here o'erthrownl
The courtier's, soldier's, scholer's,
eye, tongue, sword. 163.
Hamlet is as he is because the humor of melancholy predominates in him, not as a natural quality of his
162.
163.

III, 1, 49-54.
Hamlet, III, 1, 149-150.
~:

disposition, but superinduced by his great grief for his
father, and his sense of Shame and outrage at the manner
of his father's death.

Miss Crunpbell states this opinion,

and remarks that naturally Hamlet was of sanguine disposition.

We are sure that there must have been a great

change in the disposition of Hamlet from the words, !tHe
has forgone all mirth, failed to find delight in nature
or in man."
~

These changes are noteworthy because they

changes, and indicate that the melancholy disposition

is not natural to him.

Miss Campbell continues:

The grief that leads to the deadly sin of
sloth was one of the regularly recognized types
of that wicked grief which refuses to be consoled. ~~at such grief results in melancholy,
a grief which so dries and cools the brain that
the images of memory cannot be clearly retained,
and a man's mind becomes dark and sluggish, is
indicated in the writings of many authorities
on the passions. To the philosopher of Hamlet's
day, the picture, then, of one moved to revenge
by heaven and hell and yet stayed by an excess
of grief from action ••• would not have seemed to
call for poetic exposition. Hamlet's type of
grief was one generally accepted in his day. 164.
Mr. Wilson Knight, on the same subject, remarks that
when we first meet Hamlet the passion of melancholy has
already started its disintegrating work, and that during
-the rest of the play his outstanding peculiarities are
his bitterness and his disillusionment. 165.
164.
165.

Campbell, op.cit., p. 131.
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The melancholy which infects Hamlet's disposition,
and which changes the entire course of his life, is the
direct result of his father's death, and of the revelation the ghost makes to him of the manner of that death.
The duty of revenge Which the father lays upon his son
is also one of the causes of Hamlet's melancholy.

Looked

at in that light, it is an evil, but it must be considered
in the light of Renaissance thought, and not from a modern viewpoint.

Revenge was a sacred duty, especially in

the case of revenge for a death; and it was in the interests of carrying out this duty of revenge, that Hamlet
"wipes from the table of his memory, all trivial fond
records," 166. and declares that, "the commandment of
the ghost shall live within the book and

vol~

of his

brain, unmix'd with baser matter," 167. until the behest
of his father be fulfilled.
There never enters Hamlet's mind a doubt as to the
morality of revenge--a question that would certainly be
foremost in a modern mind.

The only difficulty that he

has with regard to heeding the behest of the ghost, is
the possibility that the apparition is not the spirit of
his father.
166.
167.

Hamlet, I, 5, 95.
~: I, 5, 98-99.

Hamlet

The spirit that I have seen
May be the devil: and the devil
hath power
To assume a pleasing shape; yea,
and perhaps
Out of my weakness and my melancholy
Abuses me to damn me. 168.

The phase of the revenge that troubles Hamlet's
conscience is not the morality of carrying it out, but
the fact that he has not done his father's bidding immediately; and this procrastination, according to modern
critics, is due, not to weakness and vacillation of character, but to a sluggishness caused by the passion of grief.
He is so overcome by the confirmation of his suspicions
with regard to his uncle, and by a knowledge of his mother's
perfidy, that he contemplates suicide.

In the famous liTo

be, or not to be," soliloquy it is not so much the fact
that suicide is forbidden by God's law, that keeps him
from it, but, the vivid imagination of the eternal punishment that will fall upon suicides.
Hamlet

168.
169.

\Vho would fardels bear
To grunt and sweat under a weary life,
But that the dread of something after
death,
The undiscover'd country, from whose
bourn
No traveller returns, puzzles the will
And makes us rather bear the ills we
have
Than fly to others that we know not of?
Thus conscience does make cowards of us
all. 169.

Ibid: II, 2, 595-599.
Ibid: III, 1, 74-81.

In another place, however, suicide as a direct sin
against God is more immediately pointed out.
0, that this too, too solid flesh would
melt,
Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew!
Or that the Everlasting had not fix'd
His canon 'gainst self-slaughter. 170.
Hamlet's conscience then, is a deterrent in the task
of fulfilling his father's commandment, but this was surely
not intended by Shakespeare to be the motive of the delay.
Stoll says that in revenge tragedies of Shakespeare's day,
there was always a delay, as indeed there must have been
to afford time for the working out of the plot.

~Vhat

is

necessary is to provide sufficient motive for the delay.
In Hamlet a number of motives are at least suggested,
though not all of them are presented with any fullness.
Among these are the doubt about the ghost's identity (already discussed), the hero's aversion to the deed,
The time is out of joint! 0 cursed spite
That ever I was born to set it right, 171.
and the desire to kill the king when he is engaged in some
act of wickedness instead of in prayer.

As to this final

motive, it seems unnecessarily vindictive to us but it
would not be so from the viewpoint of an Elizabethan audience.
170.
171.

It was held that the future fate of an individual
Ibid: I, 2, 129-132.
Ibid: I, 5, 181-2.

depended to a great extent upon his state or occupation
immediately at the moment of his death.

Therefore it

would have been against the perfection of Hamlet's revenge
and therefore in opposition to his conscience, to kill the
king when his heart was "season'd for its passage."
After Hamlet's mind is made up and he is thoroughly
convinced that the king is guilty, he refrains from action
only once: when he comes upon the king praying.

Here, if

we are to trust his own explanation, he refrains for a
reason entirely consistent with his conscientious earlier
behavior.

Now, sure of his duty, he has determined to

perform it with scrupulous thoroughness, and is dissatisfied with any mere approxLmation of accomplishment.

After

Hamlet has been convinced of his duty, and is determined
to carry it out, the ghost of his father appears to him
again, and here it is that the idea of conscience is most
fully developed.

His conscience tells him that he should

not have spared the king, that he should not have so cruelly wrung his mother's heart.

This "conscience" of Hamlet

comes in as his father's ghost, visible to him but invisible
to his mother.

The ghost of Hamlet's father urges him to

revenge, not so much for himself as for Denmark; he makes
no stipulations with regard to Claudius' damnation, and he
expressly warns his son against cruelty to his mother.
One deed of Hamlet's which is difficult of explanation

because it seems so vindictive and so unnecessarily cruel,
is the sending of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to their
death.

That he should kill Polonius is in the scope of

his revenge,--he thought it was the king, and his apparent
indifference when he discovers his error, is due to preoccupation with his plans for revenge; but these two young
men, although they were tools of Claudius, showed no great
enmity for Hamlet, and he was hardly justified in his
treacherous act of cruelty toward them.

This act of Hamlet's

is inconsistent with his character, and calls forth a sort
of concealed protest from Horatio, who usually agrees with
all Hamlet's plans, and is willing to accompany him in
everything.
So Rosencrantz and Guildenstern go to't. 172.
Hamlet answers his scruples with the decided answer:
vVhy man, they did make love to their
employment;
They are not near my conscience. 173.
One is inclined to believe that, if melancholy had
not so strong a hold upon Hamlet, he would have found the
murder of these two old school-companions very near his
conscience, however influenced they were by the false reasoning of the king to aid him against Hamlet.
After Hamlet's revenge has been partly carried out
172.
173.

Ibid: V, 2, 55-56.

Ibid: V, 2, 57-58.

--after he has overcome the sluggishness which his melancholy has forced upon him--he goes straight on, without
any hesitation from moral scruples; in fact his moral
judgment commends him rather than otherwise.

The passion

of grief has been the cause of his long procrastination,
and his conscience condemns him for it, but at the climax
of his sacrifice his conscience is clear and his mind free
from doubt.

He proves himself in this to be a tragic hero,

not a villain.

Passion has led him to disregard for a

time the warnings of his conscience, but he recovers, and
dies at peace.
Claudius is a character in Hamlet which also offers
many interesting problems of conscience.

A most remarkable

discussion as to the guilt of Claudius, remarkable because
it differs so radically from the generally accepted opinion,
is that of Wilson Knight in the Wheel of Fire.
It is a mistake to consider Claudius as
a hardened criminal. vYhen Polonius remarks on
the hypocrisy of mankind, the king murmurs to
himself:
0, 'tis too true 1
How small a lash that speech doth give
my conscience. 174.
Again, Hamlet's play wrenches his soul with
remorse--primarily not fear of Hamlet, as one
might expect, but a genuine remorse.
174.

Ibid: III, 1, 47-48.

\Vhat then? what rests?
Try what repentance can. What can it
not?
Yet what can it, when one cannot repent?
o wretched state! 0 bosom black as death!
o limtd soul, that struggling to be free,
Art more engagtd! Help, angels! make
assay!
Bow, stubborn knees, and, heart with
strings of steel
Be soft as sinews of the new born babe!
All may be well. 175.
Set against this lovely prayer--the full
flower of a human soul in anguish--is the entrance
of Hamlet, the late joy of torturing the King's
conscience still written on his face, his eye
a-glitter with the intoxication of conquest, vengeance in his mind, his purpose altered only by
the devilish hope of finding a more damning moment
in which to slaughter the King, next hastening to
his mother to wring her soul, too. Which, then,
at this moment in the play, is nearer the Kingdom
of Heaven? The question of the relative ~orality
of Hamlet and Claudius reflects the ultimate problem of the play. Claudius is very human, Hamlet
is inhuman. Through no fault of his own Hamlet
has been forced into a state of evil. Claudius,
whose crime originally placed him in a state of
evil, is now in a state of healthy and robust
spiritual life. 176.
This opinion is indeed hard on Hrunlet, and I fear,
would not meet the approval of many present day critics;
and I hardly think that it would be at all accepted by
Elizabethan playgoers, who undoubtedly must have regarded
Hamlet as a tragic hero, a victim of circumstances, chosen
by fate to avenge a horrible crime, and Claudius as a
175.
176.
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deep-dyed villain, whose moments of remorse were as truly
caused by the reason influenced by passion, as were his
very deeds of wickedness.
Stopford Brooke expresses the generally accepted opinion with regard to the guilt of the king:
Fear is a common inhabitant in a treacherous soul. After the Mouse Trap, fear drinks
up his (the king's) heart; and fear awakens his
drugged conscience into idiotic speech. The
King's conscience, for Shakespeare does not
leave him without a semblance of it, totters
about, uttering confused contradictions, and
falls back again into its drugged slumbers.
\~at sort of conscience it was, we hear in his
soliloquy, when (after the terror of his discovery) he tries to pray. Shakespeare opens
the secret chrunbers of his soul. He confesses
himself to himself-- his murder, his inability
to pray. But there is forgiveness in heaven,
he says, else what were the use of the existence
of mercy; and to pray is to be pardoned. So
will my fault be gone. But then, I keep all the
pleasant results of my crime, and I doubt that
one can be pardoned and retain the offence. That
is often the way with earthly law, but not with
heavenly.
He prays; but his heart and its fear keep
his thoughts to earth. He cannot get away from
his dread of discovery.
All the srune, it is a relief to have it out
with his conscience, to have listened to its wail
and bid it go to sleep; to have confessed in speech
his crime; to have bluffed heaven with a desire
for repentance. 177.
This is surely the orthodox explanation of Claudius'
conduct, and is more easily accepted than that of Knight,
who would have us believe that the king is a beautiful
177.
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character, surprised by passion into a sin of which he
heartily and sincerely repents.

If passion is the cause

of his sin, the same sudden change is the cause of his
conversion.

'l'his sudden repentance, which according to

Elizabethan psychology, ·was caused by the ready movement
of spirits to the heart, serves to convince the audience
all the more surely of his guilt.
Another comment on the same subject, one which gives
a clear picture of the effect of passion on the king, and
characterizes him as a villain, is given by Miss Campbell:
There is still to be reckoned the ·sin
which is mortal, the sin which has come as
the effect of passion which has perverted the
will. The King as he tries to pray sees himself accur'sed like Cain and yet hopeful of
mercy. But he cannot be forgiven while yet
he holds the rewards of his deed. The three
objects of his passion, in themselves sinful,
are thus indicative of the mortally sinful
nature of the King's passion. Ambition and
lust have taken possession of him until they
have turned his reason into an instrument for
their own uses, and until they have indeed
turned his soul away from God into mortal sin.
And though God's vengeance is slow, there is
no doubt in the mind of any reader of Hamlet,
that the King has suffered punishment from the
moment when he committed the crime, in the fear
and suspicion and unrest of his days, in the
increasing battalions of his troubles, and in
the sick soul which could not rid itself of
passion to find peace with God. Nor can any
reader doubt that the eternal vengeance of God
is to fall upon the King. 178.

178.

Campbell, op.cit., p. 145.

There is still to be considered the problem of conscience in some of the minor characters in the great play.
The picture of the Queen's conscience is given in her
own speeches and also in Hamlet's in the closet scene.
There we see again the picture of sin as evil willed by
reason perverted by passion.

Hamlet says this plainly when

he accuses his mother:
You cannot call it love, for at your age
The heyday in the blood is tame, it's
humble,
And waits upon the judgment; and what
judgment
Would step from this to this? 179.
Hamlet speaks such truths to his mother, that she
realizes that passion has overcome her judgment, and begs
him to
Spe ak no more,
Thou turn'st my very eyes into my soul;
And there I see such black and grain'd
spots,
As will not leave their tinct. 180.
Hamlet sees that his

motl~r

realizes her guilt, and

begs her to "confess herself to heaven, repent what was
past, and avoic V'Jhat was to come.

fI

181.

Harnlet has "set up a glass, in which his mother can
see the inmost part of hert! and he begs her to turn away
from the evil into which passion has led her, and to
179.
180.
181.
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conquer the devil by acts of virtue.

She promises to keep

Hamlet's secret, though she does not agree to keep the
remainder of his behest.

However her soul has been touched

with remorse, and from this point she seems to defend Hamlet
and to take sides with him at least covertly.
science reasserts its sway.

Her con-

She says:

To my sick soul, as sins true nature is
Each toy seems prologue to some great
amiss,
So full of artless jealousy is guilt
It spills itself in fearing to be spilt. 182.
The cry of a guilty conscience, remorseful and not
knowing how to be rid of its burden, is evident in these
lines.

The queen's punishment goes on to the very catas-

trophe, as one woe follows upon another's heels, and her
consciousness of her love for her son and the end of her
wrongdoing come upon her.

She is remorseful, and although

Shakespeare does not say directly that she repents, we are
certainly led to think that in the end her judgment again
unites itself with her reason, and she is able to bring
her passions under the control of her will.
In the case of Polonius, he has no morality except the
morality of worldly wisdom.

According to his standards of

morality, which are not more than surface-deep, his reason
allows him to listen behind the arras, and to use his
daughter as a tool for his spying.
182.

~:

IV, 5, 16-19.

o~vn

It is not passion that

moves him, but perverted reason.
As for Ophelia herself, she is too much under the
control of her father to act freely, and in accord with
her reason.

Her conscience is free, but her will is not,

and thus she has her share in bringing about the final
catastrophe.
Horatio is a man "vlho is not passion's slave", who
acts exactly in accord with his conscience; he is one
of those gentlemen of whom Castiglione speaks--tlan honest,
a fair-conditioned man, and of an upright conscience."
Finally, Laertes is moved by passion.

His love for

his father makes him speak and act against his conscience
in that he dares the punishments of hell, in order to
avenge himself upon his father's murderer:
To hell, allegiance! vows, to the
blackest devil! .
Conscience and grace, to the profoundest
pit!
I dare damnation. To this point I stand,
That both the worlds I give to negligence
Let come what comes. 183.
Laertes is Sincere, but because of his association
with Claudius, his will becomes infected with evil and
he descends to treachery.
In this great

pl~y,

the poet has given us all vari-

eties of innocence and guilt, and from the study of this
one play, we might arrive at Shakespeare's conception of
conscience in all its phases.
183.

~:
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Chapter IV.

A Summary of Shakespeare's Treatment of the
Problem of Conscience.

E. E. Stoll, in his study of Othello and Hamlet
from a historical and comparative point of view, tells us
that he would have us not try to find a definite psychological system in Shakespeare.

He does not attempt to dis-

cover philosophical or ethical causes for variations in
conduct, and sudden changes of moral standards.

He says

that Shakespeare was a playwright, not by any means a
philosopher; that he was not interested in the moral development or degeneration of a character, but in the general
effect of the entire play •. The great conundrums in Shakespeare, such as the reason for Iago's conduct and the question of Hamlet's melancholy, do not trouble Mr. Stoll.

He

lays all that is inexplicable, or at least difficult of
explanation, at the door of poetic and dramatic convention.
Mr. Stoll himself is strictly consistent, but he differs
radically from most Shakespearean critics, both of the
present day and of earlier times.

Most writers find in

all the characters an essential psychological conformity.
The difference between modern critics and those of an
earlier date lies not in their agreement or disagreement
as to the exixtence of a great psychological field of
study in Shakespeare; the difference is in the viewpoint
of that study.

It was the practise of earlier students

of Shakespeare to interpret

charact~r

problems, not from

the viewpoint of Elizabethan psychology, but in the light
of modern investigation in that line.

Modern writers have

been concerned not to discover what they might expect
characters to do according to their own knowledge of psychology, but they have made it their aim to interpret the
characters from the viewpoint of Renaissance and Elizabethan
psychology and moral philosophy.

Surely, if we are to

arrive at the truth with regard to Shakespeare's portrayal
of his characters, we must view them in the light of his own
knowledge.

Shakespeare may not have been a philosopher or

a psychologist, he probably was neither, consciously; but
he was a profound student of human nature.

He learned by

first-hand observation the causes and effects of actions
upon a man's character.

But beside this "holding the mir-

ror up to nature II , which is the most far-reaching and comprehensive reason for his greatness, he must have had also
a complete and detailed knowledge of the psychology of his
times, even though that knowledge was practical and applied,
rather than scholarly and scientific.

We cannot consent

that it was with no motive except dramatic stage effect
that he portrays so vividly the result of the workings of
passion upon Macbeth; or that he did not have a comprehensive knowledge of the accepted psychology of the passions
when he drew the great figures of Hamlet and the King.

Mr. Craig, in his notes on

~~,

says:

Renaissance moral philosophy is a greater,
worthier, and profounder thing than our current
speculations on such subjects usually are. Shakespeare said great and far reaching things about
life, though not always the things his critics
make him say, and has as his instrument a great
ethical system of which we have grown unconscious. 184 •
In the study of the conscience in the plays of Shakespeare, this fact of his consistent application of the
accepted psychological principles of his day, becomes evident.

The plays present examples, thoroughly consistent

and intelligible, of problems of conscience in all its
phases.

After the Elizabethan understanding of this phase

of moral philosophy has been discussed and its principles
laid down, it is with a growing feeling of admiration for
Shakespeare's profound insight into moral problems that
one finds examples carefully drawn and psychologically
consistent, of each phase of the conscience problem, most
graphically and truthfully presented.

And what strikes

one as remarkable and worthy of all praise, is that from
a study of the problems in Shakespeare, one comes to have
a growing appreciation and respect for the psychology which
was at the bottom of his characterizations.

The moral

philosophy of the Elizabethan as exemplified in Shakespeare,
is, in spite of crudities, undoubtedly authentic.
184.

It is

Craig, Hardin, "Ethics of King ~", in Philological
Quarterly, Vol. 4, April 1925, pp. 97-109.

not necessary nor apropos to attempt any deductions with
regard to Shakespeare's religion.

What is to the point

is this,--that his doctrine of the conscience is thoroughly
Christian and Catholic.

Someone has said that St. Thomas

gives the principle, and Shakespeare the illustration.
The great dramatist's conformity to Catholic principles
in this matter gives him an added claim to the respect
.and admiration of all Who find in Shakespeare a perennial
source of edification and delight.
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